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Over the last decades, productivity growth has been slowing down throughout
developed economies. Since technology1 growth is the main long-term deter-
minant of productivity growth, this has ignited a debate about how new ideas
are produced and disseminated through the economy. Differences between the
growth performance of countries are largely explained by ICT capital and mul-
tifactor productivity (van Ark et al., 2008), again pointing towards technology
as an important determinant of aggregate growth performance of the different
countries. Increasing productivity growth again is a key policy objective: ”Pro-
ductivity isn’t everything, but, in the long run, it is almost everything.”2 Slowing
technology growth directly translates into lower incomes.
The matter is complicated by the measurement problems inherent in productivity
analysis. As a ”measure of our ignorance”3, productivity is notoriously measured
with error. Since many technological advances of the last decades are offered for
free (e.g. internet services), at subsidized prices (e.g. ride sharing) or in public
sectors (e.g. new drugs), they are poorly captured in GDP figures. Nonetheless,
measurement error alone cannot explain most of the slowdown (Syverson, 2017;
Cowen, 2011; Tarullo, 2014).
1As is standard in the literature, I subsume all knowledge about how to organize produc-
tion processes under technology, i.e. better management techniques, better ways to motivate




x CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
While decelerating productivity growth is seen as a problem, the causes are hotly
debated.
Techno-pessimists maintain that new ideas naturally become harder to find as
the low hanging fruits are already picked. Since it is getting more difficult to
make new discoveries, technology growth would naturally slow down over time
(Gordon, 2016).
Another school of thought relates declining growth rates to slowing technology
diffusion. In this reading, innovation progresses steadily, but diffuses through the
economy more slowly. The ”superstar firms” at the global frontier leave many
firms behind. E.g. Autor et al. (2017); Akcigit and Ates (2019) argue that mea-
sured aggregate productivity growth is declining because fewer firms are using
latest technologies.
Changes in competition could also slow down productivity growth. Aghion et al.
(2005, 2006, 2009) show an inverted U-shape relationship between competition
and innovation: Both monopolies and highly competitive markets are less in-
novative. The endogenous growth literature argues that this is because firms
innovate to fend off competition and to increase their existing rents. Monopo-
lists have no competition and thus do not need to defend themselves through
innovation. Firms in a very competitive market have little incentive to innovate
because they have many potential imitators and cannot expect to maintain their
technology advantage for long. The optimum for innovation lies somewhere be-
tween these two points. De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017); Autor et al. (2017)
present compelling evidence that competition has declined over the last decades
and that firms’ markups throughout the developed world have risen substantially.
It might be that the global economy now has too little competition for innovation.
1.2 Research Approach and Key Findings
The papers collected in this dissertation bring microeconometric analysis to bear
on these different explanations. I study the R&D and productivity reactions of
German firms to increases in competition and the movement of inventors as a key
determinant of technology diffusion. I thus examine the importance and plausi-
bility of the suggested causes of the productivity growth decline. I also discuss
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the theoretical implications of sticky inventor firm relations on firms’ research
strategy and the equilibrium growth rate. To this end, I insert an inventor labor
market into an endogenous growth model.
Chapter 2 studies the productivity responses of German manufacturing firms
to increased foreign competition (2000-2014). We measure exogenous changes in
the competitiveness of foreign firms by looking at their countries’ market shares
in third markets. We use this to instrument for the market share foreign firms
capture in Germany. We study the effect of such changes in competition inten-
sity on a whole range of firms’ specific outcomes and find that German firms
only increase their efficiency in response to competitors from other industrialized
economies. This productivity increase is not driven by increased investment in
innovation. Instead, firms cut back on costs while maintaining physical output.
They also lower prices. In contrast, firms just shrink when confronted with com-
petition from low cost countries like China. Overall, our evidence is more in line
with firms cutting institutional fat when confronted with competition than with
firms investing their ”trapped factors” into R&D, as hypothesized by Bloom et al.
(2016).
Chapter 3 studies the matching of inventors to firms on a global scale. I esti-
mate inventors’ and firms’ contribution to patent production and analyze which
inventors go to which firms. I find an increasing tendency for assortative match-
ing, i.e. the best inventors are increasingly concentrated among the best firms.
Patents are concentrated among few firms throughout the entirety of the data
(1974-2012), but become even more concentrated during that time span. Ad-
ditionally, inventors leave the most production efficient firms at declining rates,
which might slow down technology diffusion. Inventors changing their movement
behavior is not due to changes in the patent invention function, which is quite
constant over time. Throughout the time period studied, inventor skill is more
important for patent output than firm quality.
Chapter 4 synthesizes the empirical findings of chapter 3 into an endogenous
growth model with inventor firm labor markets. Firms have to slowly build up
a stock of inventors through search on the labor market. Thus, each firm has
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specific technological capabilities and firms with a large stock of inventors are
invested into the specific technology their inventors have mastered. The most re-
search heavy firms have the largest incentive to keep innovation incremental and
the mapping of technologies to products stable. The trend towards more applied
and less scientific innovations documented by Poege et al. (2019) is detrimental
to growth, viewed through the lens of my model. The model thus suggests an
alternative potential cause of slowing technology growth.
This research has been made possible by the proliferation of detailed firm
level data sets and the computational and methodological resources to make use
of them. Specifically, the literature on estimating firm level productivity with
endogenous productivity allows to compare productivity across firms (Crepon
et al., 1998; Bloom et al., 2016; Doraszelski and Jamandreu, 2013; De Loecker
et al., 2016), while the labor market literature has developed tools to describe
the matching of persons to firms (Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2013). These
techniques are central to the results reviewed above, though I have adapted and
developed them further to fit the specific use cases presented.
1.3 Connection to the Wider Literature
Throughout this dissertation, I navigate an imperfect competition framework
of firms’ decision making. The empirical results can be understood in either a
Hopenhayn (1992) type model with endogenous productivity or a quality ladder
model like Aghion and Howitt (1992); Romer (1990). In both models, firms’ con-
temporary profits depend on their current productivity and/or product quality.
Firms can also undertake actions to increase their future productivity or product
quality. Within this very general framework, several potential actions have been
studied in more detail: the decision to enter foreign markets (Melitz, 2003), the
decision to invest in R&D (Aghion, 1998), the decision to produce certain prod-
ucts (Khandelwal, 2010; Mayer et al., 2014) or the monitoring of firm managers
(Leibenstein, 1966; Stigler, 1976). Our own empirical analysis does not presup-
pose any of the specific explanations these authors offer.
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This dissertation is also closely related to the empirical literature on knowl-
edge diffusion: Numerous studies have traced technology diffusion by studying
patent data. Keller (2004) provides an overview over the different channels for
cross country technology diffusion and argues that importing, FDI and own hu-
man capital and R&D are necessary for substantial absorption of foreign tech-
nology. The FDI channel specifically has received much scrutiny: While Potterie
and Lichtenberg (2001) argue that technology mainly flows towards the FDI sub-
sidiary using aggregate data, Fosfuri et al. (2001) show that technology spillovers
arise when workers move from the foreign subsidiary to domestic firms. I will
study this inventor movement channel of technology diffusion more generally.
An example of technology diffusion that has been studied in particular detail
because of its importance to public policy is the proliferation of green technol-
ogy. Bretschger et al. (2017) build a multi-sector, multi-country model where
firms require both access to a ”knowledge pool” of green production technolo-
gies for their sector and the ”absorptive capacity” to understand the ideas flow-
ing around between professionals. Comin and Mestieri (2018) demonstrate that
technology penetration, i.e. firms’ success in adopting new technologies, is di-
verging between countries, while information technology has closed the gap for
early adopters. Aghion et al. (2016) show that previous knowledge in green vs.
dirty technology makes a firm much more successful in absorbing new inventions:
There is technology specialization and substantial path dependence. I will de-
velop the argument that much of this path dependence is because firms’ inventors
are largely technology specialists and difficult to replace.
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Chapter 2
Firms’ Productivity Reaction to
Competition
2.1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental tenets of economics is that competition promotes
efficiency. Competitive pressure threatens firms’ rents and even their existence.
To escape competition, firms in theory take costly actions to improve their pro-
ductivity (Aw et al., 2011; Aghion et al., 2005, 2004, 2009). Yet, there is only
mixed empirical evidence for this mechanism: Bloom et al. (2016) find that public
European firms increased their productivity and patenting in response to import
competition from China, while Autor et al. (2016) find the opposite for the US.
We also have little empirical evidence about how firms increase their productivity
in response to competition (De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014; Shu and Steinwen-
der, 2018).
To shed light on the effect of competition on productivity, we study if and how
German manufacturing firms increase their productivity in response to import
competition (2000-2014). To arrive at causal estimates, we exploit exogenous
shocks from the world markets in the spirit of Autor et al. (2013): When foreign
industries become more competitive in the world market, they pressure the do-
mestic German market. We find that competition from low-income countries has
no direct effect on firms’ productivity. In contrast, competition from other high-
income countries pressures German firms to improve their productivity. While
other researchers have studied plant survival (Bernard et al., 2003), employee
1
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skill upgrading (Mion and Zhu, 2013) or innovation (Bloom et al., 2016; Autor
et al., 2016), we document an effect of import competition on quantity based
TFP. However, productivity only increases if the foreign competition is from
other high-income countries. This is our main contribution.
We investigate how firms react to different competitors from around the world
to understand how and why firms improve their TFPQ (productivity measured
in physical output). Competitors from low-income countries present a different
threat to German firms than competitors from similarly high-income economies:
Low-income countries specialize in lower quality versions of goods (Khandelwal,
2010) and use more labor and less capital and technology in production (Schott,
2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005). Our data reflects that: While we cannot ob-
serve the product quality of imports directly, we see that high-income countries
threaten German products that are produced with more capital and R&D, while
low-income countries are dominant in relatively labor intensive products. We find
that these product quality differences of competitors induce the same German
firms to react very differently to shocks from high or low-income countries.
When constructing our import competition measures and estimating TFP, we
exploit the firm-product dimension of our data: Our product data allows us to
estimate TFPQ in addition to TFPR. Since increases in competition change the
price elasticity the firm faces, competition has a direct effect on firms’ prices.
Thus, revenue TFP will mechanically react negatively to competition, indepen-
dent of productivity adjustments (De Loecker, 2011). We find that this effect
changes the estimates substantially. We also use firms’ product portfolios to cal-
culate firm-specific competition measures. Using firms’ product portfolios, we
separate the effect of import competition from the effect of intermediate product
imports and account for firms being active in several industries simultaneously.
Thus, our data allows us to be more precise than previous attempts at measuring
the effect of foreign competition on firm productivity (Autor et al., 2016; Bloom
et al., 2016).
We use an IV strategy pioneered by Autor et al. (2013) to draw causal inferences:
We can measure changes in the competitiveness of China, the US and other im-
portant German trading partners within third countries, which are independent
of Germany. We isolate instances where Germany’s trading partners become
more competitive independently from German firms. We can thus instrument
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trade flows between Germany and its trading partners with trade flows between
Germany’s trading partners and a set of third countries.
Irrespective of the source of import competition, firms experience a drop in rev-
enues and reduce their expenditures for production inputs. Firms respond to
high-income import competition by reducing output prices and largely manage
to keep their output quantities constant. Firms do not lower prices in response
to competition from low-income countries and consequently experience a fall in
sold quantities. It seems like German firms are unable to compete in terms of
prices with product market competition from low-income countries. Notably,
firms surviving competition from low-income countries invest in R&D. Firms’
adjustment strategy to low-income import competition seems to be to escape by
exploring new markets or inventing more efficient production technologies. In
contrast, firms being hit by high-income import competition even decrease their
R&D spending, presumably in an attempt to save costs. Overall, we conclude
that the productivity enhancing effects of competition we document are not a
consequence of increased R&D activities. Instead, they might result from “cut-
ting fat”, i.e. realizing existing unused potential to raise efficiency. Evidently,
prior to the new competitors, firms’ managers lived according to John Hicks:
“The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”1
Firms might be inefficient either because management consumes a part of firms’
rents as leisure (Biggerstaff et al., 2016) or because of true ignorance about better
technology (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). Both hypotheses are consistent with
our findings: New competitors from high-income countries introduce close substi-
tutes to German firms’ products into the market. As incumbents’ demand curves
flatten, inefficiency in general becomes costlier. Firms pick up on that and reduce
their X-inefficiencies throughout the manufacturing sector. Such broad evidence
was previously lacking. We supplement studies documenting such competition
effects in narrowly defined sectors like health care (Bloom et al., 2015) or the oil
industry after large world market price shocks (Borenstein and Farrell, 2000).
This paper complements the broad theoretical literature on the effects of inter-
national trade liberalization. Yet, the trade literature focuses mostly on pro-
ductivity gains through selection (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz and
Redding, 2013) and not within firm productivity effects. Our study relates more
1Hicks 1935.
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closely to empirical work investigating how a relaxation of tariffs affects firm
productivity and performance (Trefler, 2004; Bernard et al., 2006; Amiti and
Konings, 2007; Khandelwal and Topalova, 2011). However, our focus is on firm-
specific import competition rather than on a reduction of industry-wide tariffs.
This allows us to clearly separate competition-based effects of international trade
from other channels.
Additionally, our article relates to theoretical work on firm productivity (Aghion
et al., 2004, 2005, 2009; Impullitti and Licandro, 2018). These models build
around the idea that a firm’s efforts to increase productivity are endogenous to
competition. Aghion et al. (2009) show that competition within a specific prod-
uct segment leads to more innovative activity when the technological distance
between competitors is small, such that a successful innovation allows follower
firms to leapfrog their competitors. In contrast, when the distance to the competi-
tor becomes larger, the expected rents from innovation decrease, until eventually
firms stop innovating. While we find that competition has productivity effects
and that these depend on the new entrants, we cannot confirm that incumbents
with different levels of technological sophistication react differently to the same
entrant. In the data, the characteristics of the entrant determine the reaction.
Our results thus better fit trade models like Khandelwal (2010), in which high
and low-income countries have different modes of production and thus compete
in different ways against each other.
However, our paper is most comparable to Autor et al. (2016) and Bloom et al.
(2016). Both use the same identification idea to study firms’ adjustment to in-
creases in foreign competition. Our paper differs from their work in three ways:
First, we paint a more complete picture of firms’ responses to competition by
considering different types of competition and including the variables through
which firms increase their competition. Second, we address the bias inherent in
estimating the effect of competition on revenue productivity. Third, we are able
to measure import competition much more precisely due to our product level
data. With these improvements, whenever we estimate comparable equations,
our results are more similar to those of Bloom et al. (2016) than to those of
Autor et al. (2016).
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the data and explains
the construction of our firm-specific import competition measures. Section 2.3
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describes our procedure to recover a quantity-based firm-level productivity mea-
sure. Section 2.4 covers our econometric strategy to assess the impact of import
competition on firm productivity. Section 2.5 presents our empirical results. Sec-
tion 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data and Measuring Import Competition
We use administrative yearly panel data on German manufacturing firms with
at least 20 employees (AFiD thereafter) for the period 2000-2014. The German
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder jointly maintain
AFiD. AFiD contains information on firms’ production inputs and outputs, prod-
uct portfolios, R&D expenditures and energy consumption. In principle, AFiD
represents the entire universe of manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees.
Yet, to limit the administrative burden, AFiD includes some variables only for a
representative sub-sample encompassing roughly 40% of all firms. Intermediate
input expenditures and employment by full time equivalents are only available
for the sub-sample and are necessary to estimate firm TFP. As this sub-sample
is stratified by industry and size-class, which are variables that we observe for all
firms, we can construct inverse probability weights to translate all of our results
to the underlying firm population.
Notably, AFiD provides detailed information on quantities and factory gate prices
for the distinct final products produced by each firm at the nine-digit PRODCOM
classification. This information is crucial for our study for two reasons: First, it
allows us to control for firm-specific price variation when estimating firm produc-
tivity (see section 2.3). Second, it enables us to define import competition at the
firm-level. Calculating import competition at the firm rather than the industry
level accounts for firms being active in multiple industries simultaneously and
allows us to clearly separate final product competition from competition in firms’
supplier markets (i.e. intermediate input imports).
To construct a firm-specific measure for the strength of import competition, we
combine the AFiD database with the United Nations Comtrade database (Com-
trade thereafter) at the product-level. Comtrade contains the value and quantities
of products traded between any two countries. After combining this product-level
trade data with the product-level production data from AFiD, we calculate firm-
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] ∗ 100 (2.1)
where g, i, and t respectively indicate the product, firm, and time dimension.
Mngt is the value of all German imports of product g from a country(-group) n at
time t.
∑
iRigt denotes the total German production value of product g (from
firms with at least 20 employees), while Rigt and
∑
g Rigt are a firm’s sales of g
and total product market revenue, respectively.
We calculate our import competition measure separately for a sample of high-
income and low-income countries. Thus, we have: n=(High,Low), where we
include USA, Canada, Japan, and South Korea into the high-income group and
China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Malaysia,
Turkey, Thailand, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, and
Pakistan into the low-income group. We apply this separation because products
from high- and low-income countries may differ in their characteristics with re-
spect to product quality, capital intensity, level of unit costs of production, or
embedded technology (Schott, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005). By splitting
import competition shocks from these two groups, we take into account that
incumbents should react differently to different competitors. Incumbents might
e.g. choose to compete over price or over quality. We discuss this further in our
results section 2.5.
2.3 Estimating Firm Productivity
To recover a quantity-based measure of firm productivity (i.e. TFPQ), we define








where Qit denotes produced quantity and Lit, Kit, and Mit respectively are the
amount of labor, capital, and intermediates used in the production of Qit. ωit
denotes Hicks-neutral total factor productivity and εit is an i.i.d. random error
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term that can represent both shocks in the real world and measurement error.





mmit + ωit + εit, (2.3)
where smaller letters denote logs and εit now is a standard linear error term.
We aim to calculate ωit as a residual after estimating the production function in
equation (2.3). Before doing so, however, we need to address three econometric
challenges.
First, due to differences in physical reporting units across products (e.g. volume
vs. kilogram), we cannot define a quantity-based output measure for multi-
product firms. To tackle this issue, we follow Eslava et al. (2004) and purge
observed firm revenue from price variation by deflating it with a firm-specific
price index calculated from information on product prices given in our data.
Slightly abusing notation, we keep using qit for the resulting quasi-quantities.
Second, we assume that the firm has to choose investment and labor before it
learns its current productivity ωit. This is justified, given the time it takes to
install new machinery and the substantial rigidities of the German labor market
(OECD, 2019). However, treating labor as a flexible input has negligible effects on
our estimation results. Nevertheless, equation (2.3) cannot be estimated directly,
as the firm choosesmit based on the unobserved ωit, which introduces endogeneity.
Third, although we observe labor inputs directly in quantities (i.e. in full time
equivalents), capital and intermediate inputs are, by their nature, only reported
in monetary units. Hence, after deflating kit and mit with sector-s-specific price
indices, two unobserved terms capturing firm-specific deviations from industry-









mm̃it+ ωit + εit, (2.5)
where we define k̃it = kit + p
k
it − p̄kst, with the tilde indicating that the respective
variable is deflated by an industry-level deflator. pkit and p
m
it respectively denote
firm-level prices for capital and intermediate inputs and p̄kst and p̄
m
st refer to the
associated industry-level price indices. As input prices are correlated with output
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volumes, estimating the above production function without observing pkit and p
m
it
produces biased input coefficients (Beveren, 2012). To address this input price
bias, we follow De Loecker et al. (2016). They show that under a number of
assumptions, the price bias can be treated without observing input prices. These
assumptions are
 differences in input prices across firms emerge from quality differences
 firms who manufacture high quality outputs do so by using high quality
inputs
 complementarity in input quality, i.e. firms combine high quality labor with
high quality intermediates
 vertical differentiation model of consumer demand
As discussed in De Loecker et al. (2016), those assumptions allow us to control
for input price variation across firms using solely information on output prices.
While they are restrictive, even more restrictive assumptions are made whenever
researchers estimate production functions of multiproduct firms without explicitly
treating the price bias in this way.
We act on this result. Specifically, for every firm we construct a revenue weighted
average of the firm’s product price deviations from the industry-wide average
product prices for its various products. We denote this index by ηit and include




mm̃it+ γηit + ωit + εit. (2.6)
The last econometric issue we face is that ωit is unobserved but correlated with
firms’ input decisions for flexible production inputs, i.e. with firms’ input decision
for intermediates. To solve this issue, we apply a control function approach in
the spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), where we
derive an expression for ωit from inverting firms’ demand function for energy and
raw materials (which are components of total intermediates), denoted by eit:
ωit = git(.) = git(k̃it, lit, ẽit, zit). (2.7)
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zit captures state variables of the firm, which, in addition to capital and labor,
influence firm productivity and the demand for eit. As noted by De Loecker
et al. (2016), zit should be specified as broadly as possible. Therefore, we in-
clude dummy variables for export as well as research and development activities,
dummy variables for the firm’s headquarter location and its main four-digit indus-
try, the number of products a firm produces, and firm-level import competition
into zit. Assuming that ωit follows a Markov-process, i.e. ωit = ωit−t + ξit, where





mm̃it+ γηit + git−1(.) + ξit + εit (2.8)
which constitutes the basis of our estimation. We estimate equation (2.8) in
one step following Wooldridge (2009) and instrument m̃it and ηit with their lags
to allow for productivity shocks to affect those flexible variables. Hence, the
identifying moments are given by:
E(ξit+ εit|lit, k̃it, m̃it−1, lit−1, k̃it−1, ẽit−1, zit−1,Γit−1, ηit−1) = 0 (2.9)
where Γit collects interaction terms entering git(.). Having estimated the produc-
tion function, we can recover firm productivity by:
ωit = qit − (βllit + βkk̃it + βmm̃it + γηit).
To allow for differences in production technologies across sectors, we estimate
equation (2.9) separately for every NACE rev. 1.1 two-digit sector with at least
500 observations. Table 2.1 presents the associated results.
Overall, our estimates look reasonable with returns to scale being mostly close
to one. Output elasticities vary considerably across industries, highlighting the
importance of allowing for differences in production technologies across indus-
tries. Note that output elasticities for capital are less precisely estimated than
output elasticities for intermediates and labor, which is in line with existing work,
e.g. De Loecker et al. (2016); Dhyne et al. (2017). For industries 27, 29, and 35
we even estimate negative values for capital’s output elasticity. As such estimates
are inconsistent with our production model, we exclude those sectors from further
analysis.
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Table 2.1: Output Elasticities by Sector
# obs m l c RTS
Sector (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
15 Food products & beverages 16,566 0.68*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 1.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
17 Textiles 3,925 0.76*** 0.25*** 0.01 1.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
18 Apparel, dressing etc. 1,367 0.77*** 0.18*** 0.04 0.99
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
19 Leather & leather products 778 0.75*** 0.22*** 0.12 1.08
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09)
20 Wood & wood products 2,850 0.70*** 0.25*** 0.01 0.96
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
21 Pulp & paper products 3,618 0.81*** 0.18*** 0.03 1.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
24 Chemical products 7,030 0.76*** 0.22*** 0.06 1.05
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
25 Plastic products 7,835 0.69*** 0.10 0.04 0.83
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
26 Non-metallic minerals 6,747 0.74*** 0.26*** 0.02 1.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
27 Basic metals 5,213 0.72*** 0.27*** -0.01 0.98
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
28 Fabricated metal products 12,944 0.70*** 0.27*** 0.08** 1.04
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
29 Machinery & equipment 14,564 0.73*** 0.13*** -0.04 0.82
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
30 Electronics & optics 631 0.82*** 0.21*** 0.28** 1.31
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
31 Electrical machinery 5,402 0.68*** 0.26*** 0.10*** 1.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
32 Television & communication 1,257 0.77*** 0.04 0.12 0.93
(0.05) (0.11) (0.12)
33 Precision instruments 3,279 0.61*** 0.23*** 0.11 0.96
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08)
34 Motor vehicles 2,881 0.81*** 0.15*** 0.04 1.00
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
35 Transport equipment 8,15 0.78*** 0.07 -0.35** 0.50
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
36 Furniture manufacturing 4,287 0.75*** 0.17*** 0.04 0.96
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Notes: Results obtained from equation (2.6) per sector. Columns 1-5 report the number
of observations, the output elasticities for intermediate, labor, and capital inputs and the
returns to scale. All regressions control for time dummies and are weighted using inverse
probability weights. Clustering at the firm-level. Significance: *10 %, **5 %, ***1 %.
2.3. ESTIMATING FIRM PRODUCTIVITY 11
Table 2.2: Firm Productivity with and without Price Variation
TFPQ TFPR
Mean SD Mean SD
Sector (1) (2) (3) (4)
15 Food products and beverages 2.20 0.23 2.83 0.16
17 Textiles 2.97 0.21 3.22 0.14
18 Apparel, dressing, and dyeing of fur 2.62 0.18 2.54 0.13
19 Leather and leather products 1.73 0.19 2.50 0.12
20 Wood and wood products 3.98 0.22 3.24 0.12
21 Pulp, paper, and paper products 2.18 0.20 2.99 0.12
24 Chemicals and chemical products 2.41 0.24 2.50 0.15
25 Rubber and plastic products 4.38 0.32 3.73 0.13
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 3.25 0.23 3.41 0.14
28 Fabricated metal products 2.83 0.26 3.25 0.14
30 Electrical and optical equipment -1.91 0.54 0.74 0.42
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 2.71 0.27 2.67 0.17
32 Radio, television, and communication 2.29 0.31 2.37 0.23
33 Medical and precision instruments 3.83 0.27 5.83 0.29
34 Motor vehicles and trailers 2.07 0.21 3.27 0.15
36 Furniture manufacturing 3.06 0.24 2.66 0.16
Notes: This table reports estimates of firm productivity. Columns 1 and 2 refer to
quantity-based TFP measures, whereas columns 3 and 4 report statistics for TFP
when ignoring firm-level price variation when estimating the production function.
Columns 1 and 3 report means. Columns 2 and 4 report standard deviations.
Table 2.2 shows estimates of our quantity-based productivity measure, to
which we refer as TFPQ, next to a productivity measure that ignores price vari-
ation across firms within industries, which we call TFPR. To estimate TFPR,
we deflate firm revenues with a sector-level deflator and omit ηit from equations
(2.6)-(2.9). While we find only minor differences between our TFPQ and TFPR
measures in some sectors (e.g. industries 18, 24, and 31), other industries display
huge discrepancies between both productivity measures (e.g. sector 30, 33, and
34). Note that the dispersion in TFPR is smaller than in TFPQ, which is in line
with findings in Foster et al. (2008).
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2.4 Identifying the Productivity Effects of Im-
port Competition






it−1γ + θt + θis (2.10)
where C
′
it−1 is a vector of control variables capturing firms’ export intensity
and number of products. θt and θis are time and interacted firm-sector fixed
effects, respectively. Controlling for firm-sector fixed effects eliminates the po-
tential for statistical jumps in firm productivity due to changes in firms’ sector
classification (as the parameters of the production function are estimated sepa-
rately for individual industries). We thus identify our coefficients using within-
firm-within-sector variation. In essence, our regression model is similar to a first
difference model but avoids a disproportional loss of observations when working
with a rotating panel (as in our case). We weight all observations using inverse
probability weights to achieve a representative estimate and lag our import com-
petition variables to allow for a time span of adjustment that is consistent with
our production model.
However, there are valid endogeneity concerns when estimating equation (2.10)
by OLS, which prohibit any causal interpretation of our results. There are two
main concerns:
1. Foreign competitors might specifically target unproductive firms and sec-
tors, which causes reverse causality.
2. Domestic German governments might protect specific sectors and firms from
foreign competition, most likely especially uncompetitive sectors.
To solve this endogeneity problem, we apply an instrumental variable strategy
following Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2014). Specially, we exploit that an
increase in the competitiveness of a country-group n induces supply shocks also
for other countries besides Germany. Using trade flows between German com-
petitors and third countries therefore allows us to isolate changes in a country’s
competitiveness that are unrelated to German policy changes or the particular
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weakness of German firms. To implement the IV strategy, we instrument our
import competition measures with the share of country-group n’s imports in to-
tal imports of product g observed in third countries. Hence, we define firm-level









] ∗ 100 (2.11)
whereMn→thirdgt is the value of product g imports flowing from n to third countries.
As for our endogenous import competition measure, we aggregate product-level
trade flows for our instruments to the firm-level by using revenue weights.
A crucial point for our IV strategy to work is that there are no other unobserved
confounding factors that are correlated between Germany and countries included
in the instrument country-group (e.g. correlated demand and supply shocks or
monetary policy within the European Monetary Union). This would violate our
exclusion restriction. Besides that, our instruments must be relevant enough to
avoid a weak instrument problem. Therefore, we follow Dauth et al. (2014) and
include countries with an income level similar to Germany in our instrument
country-group, except for all direct neighbors of Germany and members of the
European Monetary Union. Ultimately, our third country-group consists of Nor-
way, New Zealand, Israel, Australia, Great Britain, Sweden, and Singapore.
Note that the weighting scheme we use to aggregate product-level trade flows to
the firm-level might introduce another endogeneity problem when firms adjust
their product-mix in anticipation of import competition. In a robustness check,
we therefore use a more rigorous specification where we base our aggregation of
product trade flows for our instruments on constant weights using firms’ first
observed product portfolio (the product-level data already starts in 1995, 5 years
before the start of our TFP series). This eliminates the potential for any endoge-
nous product mix adjustment by firms.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Import Competition and Firm TFP
Table 2.3 shows results from estimating equation (2.10) by OLS and IV. Given
that OLS suffers from the multiple endogeneity problems discussed above, we
only interpret the IV results. For a first overview, we pool import competition
from all countries. We find that a one percentage point increase in total import
competition causes an increase in firm productivity by 0.2%.







Firm Controls YES YES
Firm * sector FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Observations 78,414 78,414
R-squared 0.986 0.986
First-stage F-test - 142.00
Number of firms 16,925 16,925
Notes: This table reports results from es-
timating equation (2.10) by OLS (column
1) and IV (column 2) when pooling import
competition from high- and low-income coun-
tries. All regressions are weighted using in-
verse probability weights and include con-
trols for firms’ export intensity and number
of products. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm-level. Significance: *10 percent, **5
percent, ***1 percent.
In several theoretical frameworks, a firm’s reaction to new competition de-
pends on the type of the competitor: In a quality ladder model in the vein of
Romer (1990); Aghion and Howitt (1992), the technological distance between in-
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cumbent and new competitor determines both the size and sign of the response.
Since competition might force firms to innovate in order to escape their com-
petitors, but also erode the rents which finance innovation, the substitutability
between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s product is also a key determinant
of the response (Khandelwal, 2010; Aghion et al., 2006; Aw et al., 2011). Both
arguments can be applied in our setup: Goods from low-income countries are
typically characterized by lower unit costs of production and lower quality levels
(Schott, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005) than German goods. The quality
of imported goods is not observed directly, but we can show that imports from
high-income countries disproportionally go to sectors of the German economy
that use comparatively little labor, but more capital and R&D. The reverse is
true for low-income countries (Appendix A). We thus are comfortable to sug-
gest that holding the product code constant, there are substantial differences
in product quality and technological sophistication between products from high-
and low-income countries. Thus, from a German firm’s point of view, import
competition from a low-wage country (as China) may pose a completely different
threat than import competition from a high-wage country (as the US). Table
2.4 separates total import competition into import competition from high- and
low-income countries (as described by equation (2.10)).
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Table 2.4: Firm Productivity and Import Competition
OLS IV IV IV IV
ωit ωit ωit ωit ωit
IMPHigh(it−1) 0.0004 0.0112*** 0.0222*** 0.0206**
(0.0009) (0.0037) (0.00713) (0.0104)
IMPLow(it−1) -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0008 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.00148) (0.0018)
IMPHigh(it−1) (only core) 0.0165*
(0.0100)






Firm * sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
First portfolios NO NO YES NO YES
Single-product firms NO NO NO YES NO
Observations 78,414 78,414 73,212 22,729 45,559
R-squared 0.986 0.985 0.984 0.982 0.983
First-stage F-test - 36.89 13.13 12.09 3.38
Number of firms 16,925 16,925 15,853 5,467 9,690
Notes: Table 2.4 reports results from estimating equation (2.10) by OLS and IV when
separating import competition into high- and low-income country import competition.
Columns 1 and 2 respectively show OLS and IV results from our baseline specification
using all available firms. Column 3 uses firms’ first observed product mix to aggregate
product-level trade flows to the firm-level for the instrument variables. Column 4
runs our baseline specification exclusively for single-product firms. All regressions
are weighted using inverse probability weights and include controls for firms’ export
intensity and number of products. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
Significance: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
The OLS estimator is again inconclusive (column 1). Using our IV specifica-
tion, we find that the positive productivity effect of import competition is solely
driven by high-income countries (column 2). This strong result implies that firms
only become more productive in response to threats from comparable competi-
tors, while ignoring low-income competition.
There are two threats to the IV identification used in column 2. The first threat
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is that firms anticipate changes in competition and adjust their product portfolio
before the shock. Thus, firms might self-select into treatment by dropping or en-
tering exposed markets. As discussed in section 2.4, we construct our instrument
using firms’ first observed product portfolio to alleviate this concern. Column
3 shows that the measured effects are even stronger when accounting for this
potential problem. This suggests that if at all, firms move away from attacked
products and our baseline methodology is thus biased downwards.
The second threat is that different countries attack different parts of firms’ prod-
uct portfolio. If low-income countries only attack firms’ peripheral products, we
might not measure a response because firms do not care about these products,
independent of who competes with them. We gauge the scope of this problem
by estimating equation (2.10) for single-product firms only (column 4) and by
estimating two coefficients for import competition in core and non-core products
(column 5). We still find that high-income countries are solely responsible for
productivity gains.
As accounting for both potential identification problems leads to higher point
estimates, we view our main specification as a conservative baseline.
Still, there are three different interpretations:
1. First, high- and low-income countries compete with different German firms
and these different German firms react differently.
2. Second, high- and low-income countries enter different sectors of the Ger-
man economy and competition in these different markets works differently.
3. Third, high- and low-income countries might produce different versions of
the same product, which leads to different responses by German firms.
Both interpretation (1) and (2) require that high- and low-income countries
target different firms. Table A.2 in appendix A shows that low-income coun-
tries indeed target products with lower capital and R&D intensity. However,
only a minority of firms (15%-20%) are overwhelmingly exposed to either one
type of competition. Most firms are affected by comparable levels of threat from
both high- and low-income countries. I.e., most markets are characterized by
the simultaneous existence of alternatives from low-income countries, domestic
German firms and high-income countries. We thus conclude that the most likely
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driver of the estimated effect differences is (3): Goods from high- and low-income
countries are viewed as different products by consumers and thus domestic Ger-
man firms react differently to their introduction.
To confirm this interpretation, we split the firms into groups according to
whether they primarily faced competition from low-income countries and accord-
ing to their lagged productivity. This allows us to check whether firms with
different characteristics exhibit the same response. To conduct this analysis, we
interact import competition with an indicator variable for each group. Table
(2.5) reports the results from this regression.
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Table 2.5: Productivity Effects in Different Groups of Firms
Firms Exposed to Productive Firms
Low-Income Competition
OLS IV OLS IV
ωit ωit ωit ωit
IMPHigh(it−1) 0.0039** 0.0209*** -0.0006 0.0098*
(0.0020) (0.0059) (0.0012) (0.0050)
IMPLow(it−1) -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0011)
IMPHigh(it−1) ∗D(it−1)(medium) -0.0039* -0.0097* 0.000146 0.0000
(0.0020) (0.0054) (0.000822) (0.0013)
IMPLow(it−1) ∗D(it−1)(medium) 0.0011 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0003) (0.0004)
IMPHigh(it−1) ∗D(it−1)(negligible) -0.0038* -0.0083 0.0009 0.0012
(0.0022) (0.0068) (0.00111) (0.00173)
IMPLow(it−1) ∗D(it−1)(negligible) -0.0035 -0.0202 -0.000312 -0.0008
(0.0056) 0.0173 (0.000456) (0.0006)
Firm * sector FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
D(it−1)(group) YES YES YES YES
Observations 78,353 78,353 68,982 68,982
R-squared 0.986 0.985 0.987 0.986
First-stage F-test - 4.938 - 8.429
Number of firms 16,911 16,911 14,493 14,493
Notes: Table 2.5 reports results from estimating equation (2.10) by OLS and IV when
separating import competition into high- and low-income country import competition. To
rule out that our effects are only driven by high- and low-income competition hitting dif-
ferent firms, this table presents results after splitting firms along their relative exposure to
low-income trade and productivity. Highly exposed firms or highly productive firms form
the baseline. Firms that experienced at least three times as much low-income import com-
petition as high-income competition are coded as highly exposed. The medium category
contains firms with roughly equal levels of exposure or a foreign market share lower than
5%. Firms with negligible low-income competition exposure are firms that have at least
three times as much high-income competition than low-income competition. For productiv-
ity, firms are grouped into tertiles according to last year’s productivity. The results show
that firms react very similarly and firms exposed to low-income competition are, if at all,
more sensitive to shocks. Thus, our results cannot be driven by which firms were shocked.
All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights and include controls for firms’
export intensity and number of products and interaction terms of these variables with the
group dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Significance: *10 percent,
**5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Firms mostly attacked from low-income countries form the baseline category
in column 2 of Table 2.5. Such firms are actually the most sensitive to competi-
tion pressure of all types, as is evident from the negative interaction terms. Thus,
while firms exposed primarily to low-income competition do not encounter high-
income country competitors often, if they do, they actually react about twice
as sensitive as the average firm. They are also the only firms to react at least
somewhat to competition from low-income countries, increasing their productiv-
ity by about 0.4% per percentage point rise in the market share of low-income
competitors. However, because of how few firms are exposed to only one type of
competition, the differences between the three groups are barely significant.
The most productive third of firms forms the baseline category in column 4 of
Table 2.5. However, these firms do not act differently than their less productive
counterparts. This is in contradiction to quality ladder models, where the most
productive firms act differently than other incumbents, especially to technologi-
cally advanced entrants. This result also holds when splitting firms by research
intensity (share of R&D in total costs).
2.5.2 Import Competition and Firm Adjustments
Of course, firms cannot directly choose their productivity levels. To better un-
derstand the strikingly different effects of competition from different countries,
we study the adjustment strategies of firms. Specifically, we analyze the effects of
import competition on firms’ sales, quantities, prices, input decisions, and R&D
expenditures. Table 2.6 reports the associated results, where r̃it, Pit, qit, lit, wit,
k̃it, m̃it, and log(R&Dit) respectively refer to the firms’ revenue, output price in-
dex, quasi-quantities, full-time equivalents, wage bill, capital stock, intermediate
expenditures, and logged R&D expenditures. Again, smaller letters denote logs.
Note that we focus on the intensive margin of R&D spending by using logged
R&D expenditures as dependent variable.
Regardless of its origin, we find that foreign competition affects firm sales
negatively (column 1 of Table 2.6). This assures us that firms are adversely
affected by our competition measures. In case of high-income import competi-
tion, the reduction in sales is driven by a fall in output prices, whereas firms
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being hit by low-income import competition reduce their produced quantities.
Evidently, firms join into a fierce price competition over market shares with com-
petitors from high-income countries, while they simply resign market shares to
low-income competitors.
Next, we analyze how firms adjust their input decisions (columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 of
Table 2.6). Low-income import competition causes firms to reduce their employ-
ment and input expenditures. Although firms exposed to high-income import
competition also decrease their input expenditures, they do not reduce their em-
ployment levels. This discrepancy between wage and employment adjustments
can be a consequence of firms passing through adverse effects of competition to
their employees by lowering wages and/or of firms reorganizing their workforce
(i.e. churning).
Firms have a completely different long-term strategy in response to the distinct
types of competition: We find that surviving firms faced with competition from
low-income countries increase their R&D spending, presumably in an attempt to
upscale their products or to discover a different market. Although we do not find
any direct positive effects of low-income import competition on firm productivity,
this increase in R&D activities suggests a potential for future productivity gains
that are not yet realized one year after an import competition shock. This find-
ing is in line with Bloom et al. (2016), but we cannot corroborate their positive
effect of competition from China on productivity. In contrast, R&D spending in
firms facing competition from high-income countries seems to be victimized by
the same cost saving impulses as other expenditures.
An important implication of this latter finding is that R&D investments cannot
explain the increase in productivity from high-income import competition. In-
stead, high-income import competition increases firm productivity by forcing a
more efficient use of production inputs that translates into a reduction in total
input expenditures while keeping output quantities constant. This is likely as-
sociated with a reduction in so-called X-inefficiencies within firms (Leibenstein,
1966; Stigler, 1976).
Such X-inefficiencies are often seen as a form of rent consumption by non-shareholders
(Biggerstaff et al., 2016). If this is true, then fiercer competition increases the
price of this consumption. Theoretically, as demand curves become flatter, small
differences in productivity can lead to hugely different profit outcomes. Conse-
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quently, tighter competition will force firms to monitor their production processes
(and employees) more strictly. Since high-income competition erodes the firms’
(monopoly) rents, we interpret our findings as cross-industry causal evidence for
this behavior, something that was previously lacking, though a number of spe-
cialized studies exist (Borenstein and Farrell, 2000; Bloom et al., 2015).
Table 2.6: Firm Adjustment and Import Competition
r̃it qit Pit lit
IMPHighit−1 -0.0129* 0.0010 -0.0065* -0.0052
(0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0036) (0.0041)
IMPLowit−1 -0.0060*** -0.0059*** 0.0008 -0.0031**
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Firm * sector FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 78,414 78,414 78,414 78,414
R-squared 0.987 0.985 0.836 0.985
First-stage F-test 36.89 36.89 36.89 36.89
Number of firms 16,925 16,925 16,925 16,925
wit k̃it m̃it log(R&Dit)
-0.0097** -0.0099* -0.0131* -0.0870***
(0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0073) (0.0317)
-0.0035** -0.0029** -0.0062*** 0.0314**
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0154)
Firm * sector FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 78,414 78,414 78,414 26,544
R-squared 0.989 0.992 0.986 0.909
First-stage F-test 36.89 36.89 36.89 17.55
Number of firms 16,925 16,925 16,925 5,305
Notes: This table reports results from estimating equation (2.10) by IV. The
dependent variable in columns 1-8 is respectively a firm’s logged revenue,
logged produced quasi-quantity, output price index, logged full time equiv-
alents, logged wage bill, logged capital stock, logged intermediate input ex-
penditures, and logged R&D expenditures. All regressions are weighted using
inverse probability weights and include controls for firms’ export intensity and
number of products. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Signifi-
cance: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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2.6 Conclusion
This study analyzes how import competition affects firm productivity. To ad-
dress our research questions, we rely on a comprehensive administrative data set
on German manufacturing sector firms containing price and quantity information
on firms’ final products. Based on that data, we derive a quantity-based produc-
tivity measure that isolates changes in firms’ technical efficiency from changes in
firms’ output prices, which is necessary since competition has a direct effect on
prices.
We split import competition according to country of origin and find that firms
react differently to competition from high- and low-income countries. The posi-
tive effect of competition on German firms’ productivity is solely driven by com-
petition from high-income countries: Faced with competition from low-income
countries, the same firms do not improve their productivity.
To better understand our main result, we also document how firms achieve the
productivity improvements that we find. Import competition from high-income
countries leads to strong reductions in inputs (employment, wages, intermediate
inputs and capital), but to essentially no decline in physical output. Instead, firms
facing competition from high-income countries lower their prices. Firms facing
competition from low-income countries do not lower their prices and lose more
market share. Their TFPQ thus does not increase, they just become smaller.
However, firms increase their R&D in response to competition from low-income
countries. This increase in R&D expenditures might translate into long-run pro-
ductivity improvements that we do not capture in our empirical specification.
We argue that the documented productivity gains can only be explained if
firms are not operating at their maximum efficiency level. There is compelling
evidence that firms exhibit sizeable slack, which explains a large part of the ob-
served productivity dispersion between firms (Bloom et al., 2012). For instance,
firms’ managers might consume a part of their firms’ profits as leisure (Biggerstaff
et al., 2016). Theoretically, competition should exert pressure towards efficiency.
Empirically, this has so far only been shown in highly specific cases for select
industries (Borenstein and Farrell, 2000; Bloom et al., 2015). Our study provides
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the first empirical cross-industry evidence that firms have potential for additional
productivity gains. Whether or not they use this potential depends on the type
of competition they face.
We arrive at causal results by isolating exogenous increases of competitiveness
of German trading partners through markets in third countries, following Autor
et al. (2013). However, since we determine competition not at the sector-level,
but at the product-level, we can measure it much more precisely and isolate the
effect of competition from the effects of cheaper intermediate inputs.
Our results on innovation confirm the findings of Bloom et al. (2016), who
showed that European firms innovated in response to trade competition from
China. They are contrary to Autor et al. (2016), who demonstrated that US
firms reduced their R&D efforts. Our findings best fit a model in the vein of
Khandelwal (2010), where new competitors from similar countries pose a stronger
threat to domestic incumbents because they produce products of similar quality
and technological sophistication. Quality ladder type endogenous growth models
predict that higher productivity or more research intensive firms should react
differently to competition, which we cannot find in the data.
Chapter 3
Firms’ and Inventors’ Matching
Behavior
3.1 Introduction
I analyze a potential cause of the productivity growth slowdown in advanced
economies, namely a change in the patterns of allocation of research talent across
firms. Using the PATSTAT patent data base, I find evidence of an increasing
tendency for assortative matching from 1974-2012 on a global scale: Good in-
ventors increasingly match with firms with high quality research departments.
These companies hoard inventive talent.
The gains from this assortative matching have been small: Average patent
arrival rates have been largely stable throughout this period. The estimated
patent arrival rate of inventor-firm pairs puts less weight on the firm: Marginally
increasing firm quality increases the patent arrival rate by half as much as in-
creasing inventor skill. The patent invention function is largely stable over time
and thus cannot explain the changed matching behavior.
To analyze whether inventor mobility is a potential channel of technology dif-
fusion, I link patents to firm level data (AMADEUS 2000-2010) and find that
the share of inventors leaving high productivity firms for low productivity firms
declines. Firms’ own patents and an inflow of inventors from other firms increase
productivity and boost profits. These findings suggest that increased assortative
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matching of inventors to firms is a plausible driver of the slowdown in technol-
ogy diffusion. Conversely, since any match a firm secures with the inventors of
new technologies is sticky, matches serve as natural imitation protection: Firms
themselves report that staff retention and technological lead are their most im-
portant strategies for securing the profits from their inventions. Comparatively,
patents only play a minor role (Harhoff, 1997). Yet, while some work exists on
which inventors match with which firms (Pearce, 2019a), matching between skill
levels is understudied: To my knowledge, I present the first application of labor
market matching estimators that can recover inventor skill and firm quality to
inventor-firm relations. In other settings, however, the literature on labor market
matching has already documented increased assortative matching (Abowd et al.,
1999; Card et al., 2013; Andrews et al., 2008; Hagedorn et al., 2017).
Rising assortative matching of skilled inventors to high quality firms and
slowing technology diffusion might explain a substantial part of the productiv-
ity growth slowdown of the last decades: The literature on the economy during
the productivity growth slowdown has documented declining labor shares (Au-
tor et al., 2017), increased profit shares (Barkai, 2017) and increased markups
(De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). Rising market concentration is often seen
as a result of technological leadership by superstar firms (Autor et al., 2017).
Theoretically, slowing technology diffusion can explain productivity growth de-
creases and increased concentration simultaneously (Helpman and Trajtenberg,
1998; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). Empirically, diffusion slowdowns have
indeed been linked to productivity growth declines with diverse empirical strate-
gies (Gal, 2017; Comin and Mestieri, 2010). Akcigit and Ates (2019) combine the
two approaches and calibrate a standard endogenous growth model to show that
declining technology diffusion can fit slowing productivity growth, rising markups
and other trends in the US economy in the past decades.
To arrive at the empirical results, I adapt a state of the art labor market
matching estimator (Hagedorn et al., 2017) to be usable for linked inventor-firm
patent data. I make two methodological contributions: First, I can show how one
can substitute wages used in the original estimator with patenting performance.
Second, I develop a technique to deal with the fact that inventor-firm matches
3.1. INTRODUCTION 27
are not observed in years without patent applications. Specifically, I recover the
underlying unobserved joint distribution of employment tenure and patent arrival
rate through maximum likelihood estimation and use it to estimate the duration
and productivity of each match.
Both Hagedorn et al. (2017) and my adaptation draw from the theoretical
literature on matching in the labor market, reaching back to Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994). We both use this theory to inform the empirical literature con-
cerned with the matching of workers of different ability to heterogeneous firms,
following Abowd et al. (1999). The empirical literature has found that high
ability workers tend to sort to successful firms and finds a trend towards this
assortative matching (Mendes et al., 2010; Card et al., 2013).
I adapt Hagedorn et al. (2017) instead of other estimators intended for the
same purpose: Lamadon et al. (2015); Bonhomme et al. (2017); Lentz et al. (2018)
have less theoretical foundation and higher data requirements. This is because
they rely on grouping similar firms (or workers) based on additional variables.
Unfortunately, PATSTAT contains little information on both inventors and firms
besides their patents, so it is difficult to group similar workers and firms with
accuracy.
I use the PATSTAT data base provided by the EPO because of its global
coverage.1 PATSTAT contains inventor and firm names and rich information on
the content of the patent, up to the original document. PATSTAT can be used as
a matched employer-employee data set after extensive data treatment, for which
I improve upon Magerman et al. (2006) and Peeters et al. (2010). The final data
contains information on the output of each inventor-firm pair in each year. How-
ever, only pairs contributing to at least one patent are observed. I account for
this truncation by estimating the Poisson rate of patenting for each employment
spell via maximum likelihood estimation. This yields the probability to observe
any given employment spell and get an unbiased estimate of its duration and
expected number of patents per year.
1I exclude communist countries before 1988 since both the function and size of firms are not
comparable to market economies.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 will describe
the data and my treatment of it. Section 3.3 will present the estimation proce-
dure. Section 3.4 will present and discuss the results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 The PATSTAT Data
Patent data from across the world gathered in the PATSTAT database forms the
basis of my empirical strategy. This data contains the filing date of any patent
application, a description of the technology and the names of firms and inventors
involved. For some participating countries, the data starts in 1850, however, cov-
erage pre-WW2 is generally low. Patents from some countries are only available
from a later date onwards: E.g., Japan enters the database in the mid-seventies.
Around the same time, coverage rates improve in general and the data can give
a reliable picture of worldwide patent activity.
The following graph shows the number of patents over time for selected countries.
Note that the stable or shrinking number of national patents for EU countries is
offset by a large increase in EU-wide EPO applications.
Figure 3.1: Patent applications per patenting authority; DE = Germany; EP =
European Patent Office; ES = Spain; FR = France; GB = Great Britain; IT =
Italy; JP = Japan; KR = Republic of Korea; TW = Taiwan; US = USA. Source:
PATSTAT
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Peruzzi et al. (2014) provide a PATSTAT-AMADEUS link, which I use to
relate my inventor labor market data to actual economic outcomes like profits or
firm TFPR. Apart from string matching firm names, they use the other variables
in AMADEUS to predict which firms are more likely active in PATSTAT. Their
technique allows to merge around 140.000 companies to the PATSTAT database.
Using PATSTAT as an employer-employee data set entails challenges as well
as advantages over commonly used social security data. The following gives a
brief overview over the main opportunities and problems when using this data,
compared to standard social security employer-employee data sets. A detailed
description of the necessary data treatment steps can be found in Appendix E.
The first advantage of PATSTAT is that it is much richer than social security
data regarding the type of work that inventors do: Patent applications contain
descriptions of the technology and a list of co-inventors. In employer-employee
settings, all workers are usually treated as perfect substitutes, only differentiated
by the skill with which they produce. I improve upon this treatment by using the
IPC 4-digit technology codes assigned to every patent: I contract the technology
space into 56 technology clusters, comprised of IPC classes that often appear
jointly on patent applications. I use the clustering algorithm of Pons and Latapy
(2005). Throughout the rest of the paper, technological clusters will differentiate
inventors horizontally, i.e. there will be separate labor markets and rankings in
each technology cluster. Inventors are assigned to their main technology cluster.
Inventors’ patent portfolios are largely within one technology cluster: The most
important technology cluster of an inventor covers 88% of his patents on average
and 56% of inventors only patent within one cluster.
Second, PATSTAT’s patents are a direct measure of the output of a match be-
tween firm and inventor, which is usually not available from employer-employee
data. Since this data is normally derived from social security declarations, out-
put is approximated using wage information. However, the wage also contains
the bargaining position of both parties, which makes it difficult to extract match
production.
Third, most workers, including inventors, work in teams. Such worker teams
are not observable in standard matched employer-employee data sets. However,
PATSTAT’s patent applications contain the names of all contributing inventors.
30 CHAPTER 3. MATCHING OF INVENTORS & FIRMS
I will discuss in section 3.2.2 which assumptions create an incentive to form teams
and how such teams affect the matching rationale of firms and inventors. I will
also provide some evidence on which assumption is supported by the data.
However, PATSTAT data is not originally intended as an employer-employee
data set and using it this way also entails some challenges. Importantly, PAT-
STAT does not contain unique firm or person identifiers. Instead, it contains the
names as written into the fields ”inventor” and ”applicant” on the patent. Thus,
an important step whenever using PATSTAT is to identify individuals and firms,
for which I improve upon earlier works (Peeters et al., 2010; Magerman et al.,
2006) with a multi-step procedure.
This leaves the problem of one name representing multiple inventors. So far, there
is little systematic treatment of this possibility. I use name frequency tables, IPC
class portfolios of the alleged inventors and the longevity of alleged inventors to
find names likely representing more than one inventor and drop them from the
data.
After these cleaning procedures, which I detail in Appendix E, I feel confident
when interpreting the remaining data as an employer-employee data set which
contains both the inventors and the firms involved in any patent.
3.2.2 Patent Contents and Inventor Teams
PATSTAT contains information about the actual content of inventions through
patents’ technology classes. I use patents’ technology classes to extract informa-
tion about which inventors do similar research and could in principle be substi-
tuted. This defines the size of inventors’ labor markets. While current search and
matching labor market papers treat the whole labor market as one, I split the
labor market for inventors into different markets for different technology clusters
and propose an algorithm which can be transferred to a more standard setting,
should more data on workers’ occupation become available. Intuitively, the al-
gorithm clusters technologies between which inventors switch frequently, because
this indicates that these inventors are substitutable. Appendix F details the pro-
posed algorithm, which treats each category combination as a potential distinct
3.2. DATA 31
cluster and then connects such clusters where possible.
PATSTAT also contains information about the team structure in the form of
co-signers on patent applications. Inventor teams offer a fundamental challenge:
There is neither a theoretical model nor a readily available estimator for a situ-
ation where workers are hired and then assigned to teams. The current state of
the art estimators treat the output of a worker as a function of his skill and the
firm’s quality only, assuming that all workers work independently from each other.
In the larger literature, there are two different ways to explain why inventor
teams form.
Akcigit et al. (2018) exemplify the first way. Inventor teams create patents ac-
cording to a Cobb-Douglas production function in the team leader’s skill and the
number of inventors: λ = (xi)
ζn(1−ζ). Only the skill of the team leader mat-
ters, so mediocre inventors can make a meaningful contribution if they are paired
with an excellent inventor. Beyond this one example, this first way of modeling
assumes that inventors are in principle substitutable, but that grouping them
increases the arrival rate of patents.
The opposite approach is to maintain that inventors are complements: Each
inventor possesses unique knowledge. Inventors work together because some re-
search projects require knowledge in multiple areas and one inventor cannot mas-
ter them all. E.g. Pearce (2019b) studies how inventor teams form and how the
returns of more depth (teams with deeper expertise of one area) and width (teams
with expertise in different fields) have changed over time, relative to inventors
performing research alone.
Even before ranking inventors, the raw data can offer some guidance as to
which modeling approach is more appropriate for this particular data set.
First, the size of inventor teams is largely independent of firm size: Inventors are
organized in teams of 2-4 inventors, no matter how large the firm is (figure 3.2).
Second, inventors with a high patenting output work in teams with other
inventors with many patents. Sorting all inventors by the number of patent
families they partook in is of course an imperfect measure of skill, since it ignores
the contribution of firms. However, the correlation is strikingly high (figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.2: Boxplot of the team size per patent family, sorted by the number of
inventors working for the same firm. Firms of basically all sizes opt for teams of
2-4 inventors. Larger firms do not generally assemble larger teams. Even firms
too small to form teams of three inventors often do so by cooperating with other
firms.
Figure 3.3: The graph shows the quality of the two inventors in a team. Both
axes rank all inventors by the number of patent families they contributed to.
100 is the inventor who participated in most patent families. The x-axis denotes
the rank of the less prolific inventor in any two person team, while the y-axis
denotes the rank of the better inventor. The density of matches is highest along
the diagonal. If the better inventor is in the 100% percentile, his co-inventor is
likely to also be in the top percentile. The same holds true across all percentiles:
Prolific inventors match with good co-inventors, unproductive inventors match
with unproductive co-inventors. Matching a star inventor to a helper seems to
be less common.
Third, patent families created by large teams span more patent classes and
teams with more than three inventors span more than two technology clusters
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on average. One explanation for this pattern is that larger teams form to tackle
projects with a broader scope than what any one inventor could cover (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: The left graph reports box plots for the number of full length IPC
classes (70.000 different classes) per patent family in relation to how many dif-
ferent inventors contributed to the patents of the family. Smaller inventor teams
produce patent families with fewer IPC classes. The right graph reports the same
statistic, but for technology clusters. Inventors are assigned to one technology
cluster, but larger teams produce patents with IPC classes from two or more
technology clusters.
These data points are more compatible with some models than with others.
First, the fact that firms of all sizes form teams of the same size is not com-
patible with significant within-firm matching: If firms searched for compatible
inventors to form teams with, larger firms would use their larger pool to find
better matches and build larger teams. Instead, marginal productivity seems to
decline with team size, just as in Akcigit et al. (2018).
Second, teams consisting of two frequently patenting inventors are not rationaliz-
able with the specific patent invention function of Akcigit et al. (2018): With their
production function, high-skilled inventors should form teams with low-skilled
helpers. Instead, inventor skill levels within a team seem to be complements, not
substitutes.
Third, larger inventor teams produce patent families which span more IPC classes
and technology clusters. This is in line with a model in which inventors with dif-
ferent knowledge band together to tackle projects that span multiple areas of
expertise.
Overhauling the whole labor market matching theory to include collabora-
tive projects is outside the scope of this paper. However, the theoretical model
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presented in the next chapter will at least loosen the assumption that inventors’
output is strictly independent from each other without losing tractability. This
opens up the possibility that future work can tackle team formation in a search
and matching context. In addition, the empirical section will discuss how match-
ing complementary inventors affects standard estimators.
3.2.3 Estimating the Duration of Matches
An additional challenge when using patent data is that inventors are missing from
the data if they do not patent in any given year. The data is thus truncated,
since any combinations of inventor and firm not patenting in a certain year are
not observed. Even very productive inventors are only observed with a probabil-
ity of roughly 50-70%.2 Thus, match productivity and the time the match existed
have to be estimated.
Estimating an arrival rate for events when the underlying population is not
observed is a problem that goes beyond this particular paper. Other use cases
are e.g. publications, complaints at government agencies, legal cases at court
and trademarks. In all of these applications, only ”active” units of observation
show up in the data. The arrival rate could be learned from the untruncated
data, but this might not exist or be unavailable due to confidentiality issues. The
methodological contribution of this part of the paper is to demonstrate how to
solve the truncation problem present in such data with weak assumptions.
In the patent literature, some studies try to link patent and census data, which
faces its own problems and is not always even theoretically possible. Other stud-
ies make the ad hoc assumption that inventors work for the same firm between
observations. This in itself does not allow to consistently estimate the arrival
rate of patents, since the years before the first and after the last patent are still
missing.
The estimation I propose requires two assumptions:
2Estimated patent arrival rates are between 0.2 and 1 (see Appendix G).
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1. Inventors continue to work at the same firm between observations.
2. The arrival rate of patenting events is constant for a given match between
firm and inventor.
These assumptions are enough to recover all parameters of interest. Any po-
tential estimator to recover firm and worker ability makes assumption 2 anyway
(Hagedorn et al., 2017). Extensions where the arrival rate evolves over time ac-
cording to a known function follow naturally from the approach presented, but
are unnecessary for this specific paper. The weak assumptions necessary to cor-
rect for truncations facilitate the transfer of this correction technique to other
settings.
The central approach of the estimation is to understand the original, untruncated
data as a mixture distribution of different types of employment spells, charac-
terized by their length and the arrival rate of patenting events. This underlying
distribution creates a distribution of observable outcomes, like an observed spell
of a patent followed by two years of non-patenting, followed by another patent
(1001). The estimated underlying distribution of spell types is the one that pro-
duces a distribution of observable outcomes close to the one in the data. Given
this estimate, it is easy to estimate patent arrival rate and length for every ob-
served spell. The details of how to derive this estimate are described in Appendix
G.
Figure (3.5) shows the results of the correction. It shows the difference be-
tween a ”naive” treatment of the data, where the truncation issue is just ignored,
and the corrected data. Each arrow shows how observed spells were moved in
the productivity-length plane: In the bottom left corner, I estimate that spells
where only one patent in one year was observed have on average an underlying
productivity of just 0.15 patents per year and last roughly 8 years. If one does
not take into account the missing zeros, one would overestimate the productivity
in these employment spells. For extremely long spells (15 years or more), the
estimator even increases the productivity of some spells compared to the naive
baseline. This is because it takes into account that long spells with a mediocre
productivity would in some cases show up as unproductive. While this is an in-
teresting implication, these estimates do not matter much quantitatively, because
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Figure 3.5: Adjustment of observed employment spell productivity and length.
The starting point of each arrow is the productivity and length observed in the
data without the correction routine. The end point of each arrow gives the new
estimated arrival rate of patents after the routine has concluded. Red highlights
spells where the observed productivity was adjusted downwards, blue highlights
spells where the observed productivity was adjusted upwards.
few spells are actually that long.
As is intuitive, the GMM routine estimates that productivity is much lower
than a naive reading of the data might suggest. This is because it includes
completely unsuccessful years in the productivity estimate. Additionally, the
GMM graph is much flatter: The routine concludes that while inventors in longer
spells are generally more productive, the difference is much less pronounced. This
is because the truncation correction takes into account that long matches with
low productivity often generate only one or two patents and thus look just like
short spells in the data. Long and short employment spells are less different than
one would conclude at first glance.
After this correction technique, the data can be treated as an employer-
employee data set which for each match contains
 the estimated length
 the estimated start and end date
 the number of patent families the match participated in
 the estimated arrival rate of patenting events
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 the number of co-inventors for each realized patenting event
 expected match output λx,y as arrival rate times the inverse of the expected
number of co-inventors
While I have to adapt standard labor market matching techniques, they are trans-
ferable to this new setting.
3.3 Estimation Framework
This section details the framework within which I estimate firm quality and in-
ventor skills. The central assumption in the labor market matching literature is
that output is produced by matches of workers and firms. In the context of this
paper, inventors invent in conjunction with the firm they work for. The arrival
rate of new inventions is a function of the inventor’s skill and the quality of the
firm’s research environment, or firm quality for short. Firms’ quality y and in-
ventors’ skill x are unknown to the econometrician but known to some actors in
the economy, as is the patent invention function λ(x, y). The goal of the econo-
metrician is to estimate these objects.
There are two main challenges when transferring standard labor market estima-
tors to this setting. The first challenge is that standard estimators expect a
continuous wage variable, measured with reasonable precision. Instead, patent
data contains the discrete number of patents an inventor has applied for. Even
taking citations into account, the outcome variable is measured with non-normal
error. The second challenge is showing that an estimation procedure accurately
ranks inventors and firms when given patent-per-year instead of wages. Specifi-
cally, I demonstrate that my estimator yields unbiased inventor and firm rankings
even if the patent invention function λ(x, y) changes over time or the production
function is not logarithmic.
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3.3.1 Ranking with Large, Non-Normal Measurement Er-
ror
The problem resulting from large measurement error becomes apparent when
looking at an example: Consider four inventors A, B, C and D. They work for
two different firms, X and Z. Figure 3.6 shows the matching between inventors
and firms and the resulting patent invention rates. C and D have the same patent
invention rate of 50% a year. However, they will likely not have the same outcome
in the data: If the firm produces the expected number of patents, only one of
them will be successful. Thus, a naive ranking according to their outcome would
produce much higher skill diversion within the firm than is actually the case.
Figure 3.6: Example of inventor-firm matching. Inventors A and B have both
matched with firm X and both produce 0.2 patents per year. Hence, they both
have the same skill. Inventors C and D have both matched with firm Z and both
produce 0.5 patents per year. This is due to both inventors having higher skill
than A and B and firm Z being of higher quality than firm X.
Importantly, even ideal data would not alleviate measurement error in the
rate of patent inventions. Ideal data would contain the employment biographies
of inventors, a designation that marks when they are assigned to research activi-
ties and the patenting outcomes. However, even such data would only imperfectly
measure the patenting productivity of inventors: Patenting is a rare event and
even perfect data will contain enough measurement error to make rankings sus-
pect. Any study of the patent invention function has to solve this problem,
regardless of estimation technique and data sources.
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Measurement error in spell productivity will affect the results in two main ways.
First, it will bias the estimate for assortative matching towards 0: Even if a high
quality firm only works with high quality inventors, some matches will be unlucky
and look unproductive. Likewise, unproductive matches of low quality firms with
low quality inventors will sometimes seem really productive.
Second, measurement error will make inventor skill look more important than
it really is: Because inventors usually have few spells, their patent arrival rate
is measured with even more error than the average arrival rate of (large) firms.
Thus, any estimator will pick up on the fact that inventors at the same firm have
widely different outcomes and conclude that inventor skill is an important driver
of patenting.
The size of the bias can be substantial: In the simulation exercise described in
Appendix H with an unadjusted (Hagedorn et al., 2017) estimator, measurement
error in λ reduced estimated assortative matching by half (0.4 instead of 0.8)
and twisted the production function from λyf ,xi = yf ∗ xi to λyf ,xi ≈ xi, i.e. the
estimator was unable to detect any significant effect of firm quality.
In the example of the four inventors above, consider a potential observed outcome
for the matches in figure 3.7. On average, half of the inventors in both firms will
produce more and half will produce less patents than expected. The econometri-
cian observes these λ̂ and would conclude that assortative matching is weak and
inventors’ skills are an important driver of match productivity differences.
I use a Maximum Likelihood argument to correct for this problem: I search
for the distribution of match productivities that is most likely to produce the
observed data. To compute this probability, one needs the global joint distribu-
tion of employment length and patenting probabilities, i.e. how many spells of
which type there are in the data set. I estimate this distribution anyway, in order
to correct for the truncation problem of only patenting matches being observed
3.2.3, but the reasoning is flexible enough to incorporate any estimation technique
that yields this joint distribution. In the best case, with untruncated data, the
econometrician can just observe this distribution. In the example, the truncation
correction procedure would conclude that two employment spells had a patent
arrival rate of 0.2 and two spells had a patent arrival rate of 0.5. With this ad-
ditional information, there are two possible scenarios that could have produced
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Figure 3.7: Example of inventor-firm matching. The econometrician does not ob-
serve the original patent arrival rate λ, but λ̂, which is measured with error. Half
of the inventors in both firms produced more patents than expected, the other
half produced less. If taken at face value, the econometrician would overestimate
the difference between the inventors in both firms and underestimate the degree
of sorting.
the observed distribution (Figure 3.8).
Figure 3.8: Two different scenarios that both conform to the overall distribution
of spells (two with 0.2 and two with 0.5), but have drastically different impli-
cations for the estimated production function and assortative matching. The
likelihood of the observed data is lower if the right scenario is correct, so it is
discarded. If the right scenario was correct, all four matches had to draw exactly
the productivities observed. In contrast, in the left case, either match at one of
the two firms could have over- or underperformed and the result would have been
indistinguishable from the observed data.
Between these two possibilities, the left scenario in Figure 3.8 is much more
likely: In it, each firm has on average the expected number of patents. In the
other case, one firm consistently overperformed and the other firm consistently
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underperformed. Ideally, I would like to compute the Maximum Likelihood for
every possible distribution of ”true” productivities among the observed spells in
this way. However, with millions of spells, this is not feasible. Instead, I use a
pruning algorithm that randomly draws possible true productivities for each spell
and then consecutively eliminates the most unlikely draws.
To check the performance and robustness of my empirical findings, I undertook
a simulation exercise described in more detail in Appendix H. This exercise cor-
roborates that the algorithm is able to identify the correct distribution of match
productivity and the correlation between firm and inventor skill. However, the
estimate for any individual inventor is still subject to substantial error, espe-
cially if they match only with few firms. In the above example, the Maximum
Likelihood technique would conclude that both firms matched with inventors of
the same skill level and could thus provide a correct estimate for every inven-
tor. However, if firms match with inventors with different skill levels who do not
move to other firms, the individual skill estimates are subject to substantial error.
3.3.2 Potential Estimators
If the measurement error is taken care of, the problem of how to extract rankings
from the observed inventor-firm pairings remains. Abowd et al. (1999) proposed
a two way fixed effects estimator to capture firms’ and inventors’ contribution to
wages. Transferred to patent data, they propose to estimate
ln(λx,y) = yf + xi + ut (3.1)
where ln(λx,y) is the natural logarithm of the number of patents per year, yf is a
firm fixed effect and xi is an inventor fixed effect. This estimates firm quality and
inventor skills, but also assumes a specific, constant patent invention function.
Using this estimator and substituting patent production for wages is problematic:
A long strand of techno-pessimist literature maintains that ideas are becoming
harder to find over time (Gordon, 2016), which would imply a changing patent-
ing invention function. Additionally, the framework makes it difficult to analyze
which inventors are matching with which firms: A low estimate for a firm’s quality
will automatically increase the skill estimate for all of its workers, since both have
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to add up to the (log) expected number of patents in equation (3.1). Correct-
ing for this estimation error is nontrivial and existing methods (Andrews et al.,
2012; Gaure, 2014) cannot account for the non-symmetric error introduced by
the truncation of the data. Transferring the estimator to the patent production
function at least eliminates the implication of irrational wage bargaining that
is inherent in the above specification (Hagedorn et al., 2017). Nonetheless, this
does not offset the disadvantages above.
Lamadon et al. (2015); Bonhomme et al. (2017); Lentz et al. (2018) all build on
Abowd et al. (1999). They allow for more complex relationships between output
and inventor skills by additionally estimating the probability of inventors moving
from one firm to the next. However, these approaches require enough additional
variables to plausibly proxy the attractiveness of firms and inventors for each
other. Such information is not available in my setting. Their applicability also
suffers from the fact that I cannot definitively determine the start of an inventor’s
working life in the patent data.
Another strand of the literature has a more structural approach: Since search
and matching labor markets are well understood in theory following the seminal
work by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), one can use theoretical results in the
estimation. This of course assumes that the theoretical model is a reasonable
approximation of reality. Hagedorn et al. (2017) propose that agents behave ac-
cording to a quite general search and matching model of the labor market. The
implications of optimal behavior in this class of models allow them to identify
workers’ and firms’ types independently and before estimating the production
function. I adapt the HLM approach to my quite different data and aims.
An important difference between PATSTAT and the employer-employee data
used by Hagedorn et al. (2017) is that they observe wages while PATSTAT con-
tains direct information on output. In addition, I allow for a changing search
technology and patent invention function.
3.3.3 Ranking Inventors within a Dynamic Search and
Matching Labor Market
I recover a skill ranking of all inventors from their theoretically optimal behavior.
In standard matching models, firms create vacancies and look for workers, while
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workers search for jobs. The rate at which matches are formed depends on the
number of firms and workers searching. Whenever a firm and a worker meet, they
reveal their types, decide whether to match or keep searching, and Nash bargain
over the wage. A match is formed whenever there is a match surplus, i.e. the
production of the match is high enough to pay both parties at least their outside
option, which is to continue searching. The decision which partners to accept for
a match is the central decision in the model.
In the inventor-firm setup, the match output are patents. Thus, firms value
matched inventors as a stream of future patents, which will entitle them to a
stream of future profits. In continuous time, the value of a match for the firm
can be expressed as
r∗Vy(x, y) = [V (p)λ(x, y)−r(Vu(x)+Vv(y))](1−α)−δ ∗Vy(x, y)+(1−δ)V̇y(x, y)
(3.2)
The first term denotes the surplus value of the match: The output of the match
(value of a patent V (p) times its patent arrival rate λ(x, y)) minus the payout
streams from an empty vacancy for the firm (r ∗ Vv(y)) and unemployment for
the inventor (r ∗ Vu(x)). The two sides match whenever the output of the match
is more valuable than if both parties just continued searching. The second term
denotes the threat that the match is severed exogenously (e.g. because the in-
ventor has to move or dies). In this case, the firm loses the match but gains the
value of an empty vacancy Vv(y, t). The last term denotes the value change of
the match due to changing surroundings, given that the match survives. This
term is treated as zero, since the economy is assumed to be in steady state.
In order to make this direct transfer more suitable for a patent setting, I assume
that
1. the patent invention function is dependent on the year the match was
formed λ(x, y, tstart). This allows for inventions becoming harder to find
or cross fertilized by the technology level in other fields.
2. the search technology is dependent on the year, so that the probability of
finding a new match is ρt.
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This changes the above equation to
r ∗ Vy(x, y, t) = (V (p)λ(x, y, tstart)− (r ∗ Vu(x, t) + r ∗ Vv(y, t)))(1− α)
− δ ∗ (Vy(x, y, t)− Vv(y, t)) + (1− δ)V̇y(x, y, t) (3.3)
Note that the value of unemployment, a vacancy and a match are now time de-
pendent. The value of vacancies is time dependent since both the probability
of finding potential matches and the productivity of any accepted match change
over time.
Despite these complications, within firm and time, employees can be ranked ac-
cording to their output. This is a direct consequence of assuming that all workers
have a cardinal ability: Workers with a higher ability can expect to perform bet-
ter than their colleagues at any firm, even if the difference might be smaller or
larger at different firms. Mathematically, ∂λ(x,y,tstart)
∂x
> 0 by assumption. There-
fore, among all matches starting at the same time at the same firm, more skilled
inventors have a higher expected output. Conversely, ranking inventors by their
realized output within each firm is also ranking them according to their skill (al-
beit with noise, since realized and expected output are not the same). This yields
numerous inventor rankings (one within each firm in each time period), which
might be partially in disagreement with each other.
Assuming only vertical differentiation is of course problematic, but this assump-
tion is made throughout the literature (Hagedorn et al., 2017; Abowd et al.,
1999; Andrews et al., 2012). Compared to these studies, I relax this assumption
significantly. I split the whole inventor labor market into smaller markets concen-
trated on specific technology clusters and assume solely vertical differentiation
only within each sub-market. Using 56 technology clusters constructed from the
co-assignments of IPC classes to patents (Appendix E), I allow for much more
horizontal differentiation than usual in studies of this kind.
Yet, the rankings within firms are possibly not enough to define a global ranking:
Consider a situation where inventors only move within two groups of firms, but
never across. In this case, within firm rankings would not be informative about
which of these two groups of inventors is more skilled than the other: Since they
are never at the same firm, the two groups of inventors cannot be compared.
Just like a double fixed effects estimator, the within firm ranking based method
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requires connected sets.
The theoretical framework offers additional avenues to rank inventors and con-
nect the sets of within firm rankings. First, the value of unemployment at any
point in time is rising in inventor skill for the same reason it is rising in the
original model: A more skilled inventor can always exactly replicate the search
and matching strategy of a less skilled one, but produce more output and receive
a higher wage. A symmetrical argument can be made from the viewpoint of the





Vu(x, t) and Vv(y, t) are of course unobserved, they are by definition equivalent
to the expected discounted lifetime earnings of a worker.
However, from this it does not necessarily follow that the inventor’s skill is in-
creasing in lifetime productivity. If the patent invention function is not super
modular, an inventor might earn more by matching with low quality firms, be-
cause good inventors can extract high wages in these matches. This introduces a
negative relationship between high output and high wages and might cause the
expected patent output to be falling in inventor quality. Thus, the derivation will
only work if the production does not exhibit strongly negative supermodularity.
Labor market matching seems to be assortative across very different estimation
techniques, data sets and applications (Abowd et al., 1999; Andrews et al., 2008;
Borovičková and Shimer, 2017; Card et al., 2013; Kantenga, 2016; Gaure, 2014;
Lentz et al., 2018). Assuming assortative matching is equivalent to assuming
that the inventor production function is (weakly) supermodular. Thus, exclud-
ing strongly disassortative matching seems an unproblematic assumption made
necessary by the fact that I observe production and not wages.
3.3.4 Aggregating Conflicting Rankings
From the above, one can get global rankings of workers (according to their life-
time patent output and productivity). There are also multiple shorter rankings
comparing worker productivity within each firm. While they should theoretically
all be in agreement, they are not, due to the noise in the data.
Hagedorn et al. (2017) propose to aggregate these rankings by finding the rank-
ing that has the fewest disagreements with the data. Specifically, they count
disagreements using the Kendall score, i.e. whenever a candidate ranking ranks
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Table 3.1: Firms’ Voting Power in Kendall rank aggregation
Firm X Firm X Firm Y Firm Y
ranking yearly patents ranking yearly patents
Inventor A 1 0.3 2 0.3
Inventor B 2 0.2 3 0.2
Inventor C 2 0.2 - -
Inventor D 3 0.1 1 0.4
Nr. of Ranked Inventors 4 3
Nr. of Relations 6 3
Voting power of firms in Kendall rank aggregation. The two firms disagree about the
ranking of inventor A and D. However, since firm X has ranked more inventors, the
aggregate ranking will reflect its preferences: Currently, the inventors are ranked A, B,
C, D, following the preferences of firm X. The issue is whether to put inventor D in first
place, following the preferences of firm Y. Yet, moving D to the top generates three
disagreements with firm X. Leaving D at the bottom generates only two disagreements
with firm Y.
worker x1 higher than worker x2, they count how many rankings of individual
firms have it the other way around and weight this result with the noise inher-
ent in the observations. Unfortunately, this ranking problem is NP hard, i.e. it
cannot be solved exactly with current computers. Hagedorn et al. (2017) show
that assuming that the ranking distance function has only one local (and global)
minimum yields accurate rankings, even for relatively noisy data.
While this strategy demonstrably yields good approximations of reality when
used with typical employer-employee data, this rank aggregation has some prop-
erties that are not desirable (Yoo et al., 2019). Specifically, the scheme gives
more voting power to complete rankings. To see this, consider table 3.1. The
aggregate ranking only reflects the ranking of firm X, even though firm Y ranks
inventors exactly the opposite way. This is because firm X has ranked an addi-
tional inventor, so it generated quadratically more relations of the form ”inventor
A is better than inventor B”.
Moreno-Centeno and Escobedo (2016) propose to solve this issue by down-
weighting each firm’s ranking with the number of relations submitted. While
this might be a valid response to malicious actors submitting inconsequential
rankings to increase their voting power, this is not the problem at hand: Firms
3.3. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK 47
presumably have no interest in submitting as many inventor rankings as possible
to this data set. With down-weighting, the ranking of the smaller firm would
always prevail in any specific disagreement, while the big firms get to rank more
inventors. However, I would argue that this is not desirable. Instead, the weight
that any firm ranking contributes to ranking A above D should be independent of
how many inventors are ranked in between: The productivity of A and B are two
cardinal numbers measured with error, and the probability of one being above the
other is independent of how many other inventors with productivities between
the two are observed.
In the above example, assume that the yearly patents of inventors A, B, C and
D are measured without error and that both firms are of equal quality. So,
in the Hagedorn et al. (2017) framework, the only explanation for the different
rankings is the measurement error in D’s productivity: 0.1 and 0.4 are only
measurements of the underlying productivity, which, if known, would produce
the same ranking of inventors in all firms. If the true productivity is between 0
and 0.2, D should be ranked last. If productivity is above 0.3, D should be ranked
first. The fact that firm X has worked with two inventors with productivity 0.2
is not informative about which of these cases is true. This extreme example
illustrates the general point that some relationships expressed by the firms are
highly correlated according to the underlying model, which a simple Kendall
distance approach ignores.
Unfortunately, the correct distance measure according to the underlying model
is infeasible: Distance should be measured as the ”unlikeliness” of observing the
ranking in the data, given that the candidate ranking is true. This requires
an involved likelihood computation, which has to be redone for every different
proposed ranking. Instead, I propose a simplification in the spirit of Hagedorn
et al. (2017): Each inventor contributes the productivity difference necessary to
move them to the proposed slot in the ranking, weighted by the precision with
which this inventor’s probability is measured. In the above example, inventor D
would have to have 0.21 less patents per year to be ranked last, as the current
ranking suggests. Unlike the Hagedorn et al. (2017) estimator, this distance
measure is independent of how many inventors are ranked in between.
Yet, using a new estimator on a new data set in a new context would make any
comparison of the results to the previous literature difficult. Hence, I report
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results for the HLM estimator throughout the paper, in order to stay compatible
with the literature.
3.3.5 Ranking Firms within the Model
To rank firms, I will aggregate inventors of similar skill estimates into 100 blocks,
following Hagedorn et al. (2017). Within each of these blocks, better firms will
produce more with the given inventors. Thus, one can construct 100 firm rank-
ings within each inventor skill level. Aggregating these rankings into one Kendall
ranking is less problematic than aggregating rankings within individual firms,
because each inventor skill class contains roughly the same number of statements.
Using a theoretical search and matching model for identification also has
some limitations: In this model, firms do not take into account that employees
are potential channels of knowledge diffusion. Introducing knowledge diffusion
into such a model is beyond the current theoretical literature (Hagedorn et al.,
2017). This is because such mechanics make match surplus contingent on firms’
productivity, the productivity of their competitors, the knowledge each inventor
holds and the matching strategies of all other firms and inventors. The effect on
matching strategies depends on multiple parameters: on whether individual in-
ventor skill is important to transfer technologies, on whether technology diffusion
affects a firm’s research quality and on whether the diffusion is permanent after
that inventor leaves the firm again. This introduces enough complexity to make
the model intractable.
While my model-reliant approach cannot fully cover these mechanics, neither
could an approach based on inventor movements (Lamadon et al., 2015; Bon-
homme et al., 2017; Lentz et al., 2018) or double fixed effects estimation (Abowd
et al., 1999): If inventors move from good to bad firms to not produce but diffuse
knowledge, inventors’ job ladders do not always lead them to higher quality firms.
Likewise, if inventors strategically move between firms, the double fixed effects
assumption that worker movements between firms are random is violated. Thus,
neither approach in the literature can fully tackle knowledge diffusion through
workers, which is problematic in most settings in which these types of estimators
are currently used.
However, worker rankings derived from differing patent arrival rates within firms
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are relatively robust to these concerns. Assume that workers produce patents
as described above, but provide additional value depending on how efficient the
production of their last employer was. In this case, there is an incentive to poach
inventors from high productivity firms, but given that inventors work in the same
firm, their patent productivity is still a valid differentiator within. The ranking
I use becomes problematic only if patent production at the current firm becomes
itself a function of the last firm’s productivity. In this sense, my estimator is
robust to most simple technology diffusion mechanisms.
Allowing firm quality to change over time also alleviates concerns that peer ef-
fects or agglomeration effects might bias the estimation. Moretti (2019) shows
that holding both inventor and firm constant, denser agglomeration of matches
can increase output by up to 25%. However, this does not have a large impact
on the inventor rankings because most good inventors are in highly agglomerated
regions: In the US data of Moretti (2019), ten cities account for between 60 and
75% of all patents in the top technology clusters. Thus, most productive inven-
tors are on equal footing in terms of knowledge spillovers. This carries over to
PATSTAT, the data basis for this analysis: While detailed geographical informa-
tion is only available in PATSTAT from 2000 onwards, the available data shows
that many patents come from the NUTS2 region with the most patents in each
country. Therefore, agglomeration effects do not significantly change the ranking
of inventors and will largely be soaked up in the firm quality measure, which cap-
tures both the ”pure” research skill of the firm and the knowledge spillovers from
other nearby firms. The number of firms with significant research departments
in more than two NUTS2 regions per country is small.
To account for changes in cluster size and the possibility that firms’ innate quality
changes over time non-parametrically, I estimate firm quality for every five years
separately. I.e., I effectively treat the same firm after five years as a separate firm
and rank it again.
3.3.6 Patents and Productivity
To relate the patent data to economic outcomes, I follow the approach of Do-
raszelski and Jamandreu (2013). They jointly estimate firm level productivity
and the effect of endogenously chosen R&D investment on productivity. For
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R&D investment, I substitute the observed size of the firm’s research department,
patenting outcomes and the firm’s estimated quality. This has both econometric
and theoretical advantages. Doraszelski and Jamandreu (2013) themselves note
that it is unclear how much of the time variation of R&D investment is due to
accounting practices and how much is economically relevant. Additionally, there
is presumably a time lag of unclear length between investment in R&D and actual
productivity improvement. Thus, I use the measured quality adjusted size of the
research department as an endogenous choice variable. I use realized patenting
counts to narrow down when the investments into research paid off.
Specifically, I assume that (log) revenue is a function of (log) inputs and (log)
productivity
yit = β0 + βk ∗ kit + βm ∗mit + βl ∗ lit + ωit (3.4)
where k denotes the log of capital in the books, m denotes the log of intermediate
inputs and l denotes the log of employees. I also assume that productivity follows
a Markov process of the form
ωit = g(ωit−1; pit−1; Λit−1) + uit−1 (3.5)
where pit−1 denotes the number of patents a firm has filed in the last year, Λit−1
denotes the quality weighted size of the firm’s research department and ωit−1 is
lagged productivity. As is common in the productivity estimation literature, I
will approximate the function g(.) by a third order polynomial of all its terms.
Including both the researchers of the firm and their output allows for a posi-
tive effect of this highly skilled personnel even before they produce patentable
research.
The equations are identified by the timing assumptions prevalent in this liter-
ature: It is assumed that the firm has to decide on investment and thus k at
the end of the previous year, before knowing its productivity. Thus, capital is
by assumption uncorrelated with ωit in equation (3.4). In contrast, l and m are
optimally chosen, given the productivity the firm expects. The law of motion
yields that productivity is predicted by ωit−1,pit−1 and Λit−1. Thus, l and m are
exogenous when controlling for the productivity the firm could expect. Thus, I
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estimate
ωit = β0 + βk ∗ kit + βm ∗mit + βl ∗ lit + g(ωit−1; pit−1; Λit−1) + uit−1 (3.6)
which yields unbiased estimates of βk, βl&βm. For a detailed and general dis-
cussion of this control function approach to production function estimation, see
De Loecker et al. (2016). Since I cannot control for prices with the data at hand,
I follow Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to compute the markups implied by firm
behavior: In static equilibrium, firms will equate revenue productivity of a flex-
ible factor with this factor’s costs. This can be used to back out the markup
implied by that firm’s input choice.
3.4 Results and Stylized Facts
This section presents the results from the above estimation and distills it into
stylized facts. I explore staples of employer-employee matching estimation (as-
sortative matching, patent invention), but also the concentration of technological
capabilities in firms. Ultimately, the empirical analysis alone cannot decide on the
welfare implications of the observed changes. A model or additional information
is needed to differentiate between welfare enhancing and decreasing developments.
3.4.1 Matching of Inventors and Firms
Firms and inventors generally match assortatively, i.e. good inventors move to
good firms. To present the results from all patenting authorities and technol-
ogy clusters succinctly, figure 3.9 pools technology clusters and time periods and
shows how often the respective combination of firm and inventor quality is ob-
served.
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Figure 3.9: This graph shows the matching of inventors to firms, pooling all time
periods (1974-2012) and technology clusters. Red areas are densely populated
with spells, while blue areas are largely empty. Matching is assortative, i.e.
better inventors go to better firms. Grey areas of the plane have fewer than 50
matches.
Evidently, in general, highly skilled inventors seek out high quality firms. In-
ventors seem to be less picky than firms, so the matching area is curved upwards:
An inventor in the 50% skill percentile will only match with firms in the 25%
percentile of quality. In general, the core matching area is quite narrow, with the
rest of all matches dispersed relatively evenly across the plane.
Figure 3.9 does not take into account the different lengths of employment spells.
However, there is no strong pattern regarding the duration of matches: Matches
within every cell of the plane are estimated to last between 7 and 10 years on
average. Hence, the number of expended hours in every cell largely follows the
number of matches.
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Figure 3.10: This graph shows the labor input provided by matches of inventors
of a certain skill and firms of a certain quality, pooling all time periods and
communities. Matching is assortative, i.e. better inventors go to better firms.
Assortative matching not only differs between technology clusters, but also
evolves over time. Thus, the correlation of inventor skill and firm quality changes
over time. The correlation captures linear relationships, yet the pattern in figure
3.9 is still close enough to linear to be captured this way. Figure 3.11 documents
the development of the correlation over time for the five biggest technology clus-
ters and the three largest patenting authorities.
Figure 3.11: Evolution of the correlation between inventor skill and firm quality
within matches for the biggest technology clusters in the largest patenting au-
thorities. Assortative matching increases in most technology clusters and over
all.
The correlation is increasing over time and in most communities. The overall
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increase from 1974 to 2010 in the US is from 0.45 to 0.6, or 33% (top panel).
This amounts to about 0.004 per year. The rise is not monotone: Assortative
matching peaked between 1985 and 2000 at around 0.65. It has been decreasing
slightly from since then.
The outlier with respect to the overall trend towards assortative matching is
computing: After 1985, assortative matching is continuously sliding downwards.
Combustion maintains its high level of assortative matching, while chemistry,
foodstuffs and semiconducturs are rising.
More mature technologies in concentrated industries seem to experience rising as-
sortative matching. Semiconductors is a prime example of a technology focused
solely on a specific technological problem: increasing the number of transistors in
integrated circuits. Bloom et al. (2017) cite semiconductors as one of their prime
examples for decreasing technology growth, as it becomes harder and harder to
double transistor numbers.
To determine whether patenting rates decline in semiconductors and the economy
overall, one has to turn to the patent invention function λ. Overall productivity
will be determined by how many inventor years are invested in each cell and how
the productivity of these cells changes over time.
3.4.2 Patent Invention Function
The estimated patent invention functions are highly stable over time and put
more weight on inventor rather than firm quality. I estimate the patent invention
function non-parametrically on the same grid as assortative matching: I group
workers and firms into 100 percentiles according to their ranking and estimate
the labor input weighted average within each combination.
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Figure 3.12: Pooled Patent Invention Function: Expected number of patent au-
thor shares as a function of firm quality and inventor skill. Matches of highly
skilled inventors with high quality firms have much higher patent arrival rates.
Inventor skill is more important than firm quality.
Inventor skill and firm quality are both important drivers of patent inventions,
however, inventor skill is slightly more important: E.g. an inventor in the top
1% matched with a firm in the middle of the distribution will create more than
one patent per year, while the reverse combination is less productive.
A large debate in the literature is whether inventions have become harder to
find, i.e. whether the rate of patenting λ has slowed down. More inventions can
conceptually be the result of more efficient matching of inventors and firms, of
matches of a given quality becoming more productive, or of more inventors.
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Figure 3.13: Average productivity of matches over time. The blue line gives the
average estimated productivity of all matches formed in any one year. The blue
line gives the same, but using the patent invention function of 2005-2010 for the
whole data set. If matches could have used the patent invention function of 2005-
2010, they would have produced more patents than they did. The only exception
is at the very beginning of the data set (1975-1908), which is also the production
function estimated with the lowest precision due to relatively few observations in
many cells.
In general, the patent invention rate changes very little. However, if there is
a trend at all, patents were slightly easier to produce with the patent invention
function of 2005-2010 than they were before (figure 3.13). The patent invention
rate of matches started between 1974-1979 is the highest overall, but it is the least
precisely estimated rate, due to few matches in many of the bin combinations.
3.4.3 Concentration of Technological Competences
Patenting is a highly concentrated activity, even among those few firms who
patent at all (Figure 3.1). Within patenting authorities and technology clusters,
patents are still highly concentrated among the top 5% of firms (figure 3.14).
Patenting at all major patenting authorities is also becoming more concentrated
over time (figure 3.15). Patenting by small firms is declining the fastest.
Figure 3.16 shows that large technology clusters (with many patents) are more
concentrated than smaller ones. Technology clusters where more inventions are
patented each year have a higher share of innovative contributions by the top
5% of firms. The fitted relationship is positive even though the largest and most
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Figure 3.14: Concentration in the
largest technology clusters over time.
Concentration is measured as the
share of inventions made by inven-
tors working with the top 5% of firms
(by patent output). If two inventors
from different firms are listed under
the same invention, both firms re-
ceive half an invention.
Figure 3.15: Cumulative distribu-
tion of patents per firm. Every firm
is assigned its share of patents in
each technology cluster and time.
Concentration is continuously rising
in the US and Korea & Taiwan, ris-
ing slowly in Europe and rising and
then slightly falling in Japan.
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concentrated technology clusters are beyond the right edge of the graph. Because
concentrated fields are larger, the overall concentration is even higher than the
average concentration within fields or IPC classes.
Figure 3.16: Concentration as a function of the number of inventions within a
sector. Each observation marks a different technology cluster at one point in
time. The x axis denotes how many patents were filed in one year, the y axis
gives the share of the top 5% of firms. There is a positive correlation between
the two: The bigger the technology cluster, the larger is the share of patenting
done by the top 5% of firms.
All in all, innovation has been highly concentrated among few firms through-
out the time period. Active technology clusters are also the more concentrated
ones. Outside the absolute top, well established firms (with more than 50 patents
every year) produce a large share of all patents. These firms are a tiny minority of
all firms in the economy. The ability to regularly produce more than 50 patents
represents a sizable investment from the firm, one that most other firms seem un-
able to make. Additionally, good inventors are overwhelmingly concentrated in
large established firms, a trend that has increased over the time covered. Chapter
4 will explore potential causal forces behind this correlation.
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3.4.4 Knowledge Production and Profits
I find that patenting increases profits faster than productivity. This is troubling
in itself, since patents are granted to incentivize firms to produce public goods,
not help them appropriate private profits. The results hold in a simple setting
with an exogenous production function and when using a combination of the Do-
raszelski and Jamandreu (2013) and the Loecker and Warzynski (2012) estimator
to jointly estimate markups and the law of motion of productivity.
Table 3.2: Knowledge Production and Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(EBIT ) ln(ωsimple) ln(ω) µ ln(EBIT )
log(number of patents) 0.0536*** 0.0046 0.0030 -0.0284 0.0566
(0.0081) (0.0042) (0.0026) (0.1269) (0.0327)
Inflow Movers - - 0.0048* -0.0007 0.1986***
(0.0036) (0.0602) (0.0454)
Rank Firm - - -0.0004 0.0024 -0.0031
(0.0002) (0.0046) (0.0023)
Control Function NO NO YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 27332 27332 14771 14771 14771




3 production function, log
productivity with an estimated production function and profits. µ denotes firms’ markups.
Production function as in De Loecker & Warzynski 2012; effect of patents as in Doraszelski
& Jaumandreu 2013. Bootstrapped Standard Errors (n=500) in parentheses.
Table 3.2 reports the results of my estimation. Columns 1 and 2 report sim-
ple FE estimates, to alleviate concerns about the validity of production function
estimation. According to these results, a firm can expect to increase profits by
about 5% when they double their patenting output.
Columns 3 - 5 report the results from a joint semiparametric estimation of the
production function and the law of motion of productivity. In the semiparametric
estimation, I include the inflow of inventors moving to firms and the rank of the
firm in the research quality rating as potential variables into the law of motion.
This tests the hypotheses that moving inventors bring technological knowledge
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with them or that a firm’s research quality proxies for its absorptive capacities.
Given the patents a firm is already applying for, research quality does not offer
additional benefits. The number of inventors that move to the firm does however
increase both productivity and profits. This further supports the hypothesis that
moving inventors diffuse technology.
3.4.5 Inventor Mobility and Technology Diffusion
I find that between 2000 and 2010, inventors who are leaving top firms increas-
ingly move to other top firms, instead of transferring their knowledge to less
productive firms. Since technology personnel movement is an important driver
of technology diffusion, this might explain the increasing gap between ”The Best
and the Rest” in a large number of countries (Andrews et al., 2016; Gal, 2017).
This dispersion might also hurt overall productivity growth (Akcigit and Ates,
2019). Firms themselves rank retaining knowledgeable employees as one of their
most important strategies for protecting intellectual property (Harhoff, 1997). To
measure technology diffusion through moving inventors, I turn to the sample of
patent data matched with firm productivity estimates and rank all firms within
a region and five year time period. Splitting the resulting ranking into 50 pro-
ductivity classes, I count movements of inventors from the top 10% of firms to
the rest. I analyze the top 10% of firms to synchronize with the productivity dis-
persion literature, which considers the top 10% of firms ”frontier firms” worthy
of special attention. The matched sample between PATSTAT and AMADEUS is
only large enough between 2000 and 2010. During this time frame, the trend of
moving only between top firms is stable and persistent.
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Figure 3.17: The graph shows the subsequent employers of inventors who have
left a firm in the top 10% productivity decile. Firms are ranked according to
their productivity and grouped into 50 different skill classes, 50 designating the
most productive 2% of firms.
Figure 3.17 shows which firms inventors move to after having worked for a
top firm. Movements from top firms to laggard firms are becoming less frequent
over time. This decline is not simply driven by overall rising concentration, as
the output share of the top firms has only increased moderately. Instead, the
matching behavior of productive and unproductive firms is driving this change.
Documenting inventor rankings between firms is in the spirit of a branch of en-
dogenous growth models focused on technology diffusion (Arkolakis et al., 2018).
These models focus less on firms’ R&D decisions and more on the random meet-
ings of inventor-entrepreneurs and the resulting exchange of ideas. In these mod-
els, equilibrium productivity growth is determined both by how many new ideas
are created and how fast these diffuse. While fast diffusion leads to faster growth,
it also diminishes the incentives to invent new technologies, since the associated
technological edge is lost quickly.
3.4.6 Summary of Empirical Findings
A major result of the paper is that inventors and firms have matched assorta-
tively since 1974 and that this has increased over time. With the only notable
exception of computing, most technology clusters exhibit this trend. Throughout
the time period, the higher quality firms increased their quality weighted share
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of researchers.
The estimated patent invention functions are largely stable over time and put
more weight on inventor rather than firm quality. Because the contributions of
firms to patenting probability are not large, rematching inventors and firms can
only lead to small increases in production. In this, the paper comes to a similar
conclusion as Hagedorn et al. (2017), although the method has been altered sub-
stantially and the context is different.
The stability of the patent invention function seems to contradict popular ex-
planations of technology stagnation: It does not seem like inventions are getting
harder to find. However, the arrival rate of patent families is also influenced by
which projects firms decide to undertake in the first place: There is strong evi-
dence that firms attempt more incremental and applied research projects (Arora
et al., 2019), while patents with more scientific content are more valuable (Poege
et al., 2019). If firms are racing each other to the same ideas more often, firms
start smaller projects in equilibrium (Silipo, 2005).
3.5 Conclusion
I analyze the matching of firms and inventors and the productivity of the result-
ing matches as a potential driver of slowing technology growth. I document which
matches are formed and how much each party contributes to patent invention.
To answer these questions, I transfer empirical strategies used in the search and
matching labor market literature to the PATSTAT patent data from 1974-2010,
which I use as an employer-employee data set.
Assortative matching has risen over time in nearly all technology clusters.
Highly skilled inventors increasingly match with firms with a high research qual-
ity. High quality firms produce more patents and are larger on average. De-
creasing movement of inventors might cause a decrease in knowledge diffusion
documented by Akcigit and Ates (2019); Andrews et al. (2016); Gal (2017). I
merge conventional firm production productivity estimates to my data and find
that less and less inventors move from top productivity firms to firms with lower
productivity. I find that such movements are – when they still happen – as-
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sociated with productivity and size increases for the receiving firm. The same
pattern holds true for newly invented patents between 2000 and 2010 (there is
no matched data for earlier years).
It is often hypothesized that ideas are getting harder to find. This would
mean that matches between inventors and firms of a given quality produce less
patents today than they did previously. Yet, matches’ estimated productivity
is not declining: If matches from the 80s or 90s had used the patent invention
function of 2005-2010, they would have produced slightly more patents, not less.
These results open up interesting avenues for future research: First, narrow-
ing the scope of my analysis to a specific country with high quality firm data
would allow to assign specific product lines to specific technologies and measure
markups with a higher degree of certainty. More complete data could be used
to more precisely measure the contribution of assortative matching to productiv-
ity dispersion, markups and profits using state of the art markup estimators. I
committed to a global scope for this paper to understand patenting behaviour
across the developed world, since most contributions on the technology growth
slowdown also assume that it is a global phenomenon. However, diving deeper
into specific countries with a higher quality data set could enhance our under-
standing of firm level responses.
Second, the welfare implications of the trends documented also hinge on the
type of innovation that patents represent. To better understand these welfare
results, chapter 4 develops an endogenous growth model containing an inventor-
firm matching labor market. Firms hire highly skilled inventors for two reasons:
either to pursue more difficult, disruptive inventions or to prevent these inven-
tors from being disruptive. Firms fear disruptive inventions because disruption
changes the technology underlying their product and makes firms’ traditional in-
ventors obsolete. In this model, assortative matching can be beneficial if it means
that highly skilled inventors go to firms engaged in difficult, disruptive research.
Assortative matching can be detrimental if it means that good, large firms poach
their competition. Despite declining growth, this is rational behavior from the
viewpoint of the firms: The correlation between patents and profits is substantial
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in the model and in the data.
Chapter 4
An Endogenous Growth Model
with an Inventor Labor Market
4.1 Introduction
Expanding on the empirical analysis in chapter 3, I develop an endogenous growth
model in which growth slows down because successful firms inhibit disruptive in-
novation. This model can reconcile a set of seemingly contradictory findings:
TFP growth and scientific output per researcher seem to decline, while firms hire
an increasing number of researchers for non-decreasing wages (Cowen and South-
wood, 2019; Bloom et al., 2017). Likewise, the scientific content of patents is
declining (Arora et al., 2019), despite patents with more scientific content being
more valuable (Poege et al., 2019). The model explains these trends as outcomes
of firms’ optimal research strategies: Large firms’ profits depend on the fate of
their specialty technology. Thus, they cling to incremental innovation and un-
dertake defensive measures to prevent disruption.
The actions of two types of firms drive the fate of the model economy: First,
there are disruptive firms. Disruptors do not sell any products, but try to invent
a fundamentally different technology. Bill Gates and Paul Allen working in a
garage to revolutionize home computing were an archetypical disruptive firm. If
disruptive inventors are successful, they create a new producing firm with better
production technology than that of any currently existing producer. Producing
firms, the second firm type, actually earn revenue in the consumer market by sell-
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ing a product. Producers take an underlying technology invented by disruptive
firms and develop it into a product. Producing firms improve their technology
incrementally in order to produce a product of higher quality. Steady technologi-
cal progress requires a mixture of both types of inventions: Disruptive inventions
alone never create a consumer product, only ever more advanced production
technologies. Incremental inventions alone lead to a slowing rate of technology
growth: As incremental inventors strain against the limits of the underlying pro-
duction technology, the rate of technology growth within each technology declines
over time. Every disruptive invention allows incremental inventors to work with a
more advanced basic technology and thus increases the value of future incremental
improvements by the factor ω. This tension between disruption and incremental
growth is the central tradeoff in the model and how well the market economy
handles it determines economic growth.
Neither disruptive nor producing firms can conduct research on their own:
Firms need inventors to make inventions for them. Firms of both types hire in-
cremental or disruptive inventors on a search and matching labor market. Disrup-
tive and incremental inventors enter the economy and match with firms at fixed
rates. The value of each firm is partly determined by the stock of inventors it has
hired and those it can hire in the future. Incremental inventors are specialized
in their current technology and cannot contribute to other technologies. Thus,
whenever a firm switches the technology underlying its products, it effectively
loses all incremental inventors it has hired so far. Inserting this labor market into
an endogenous growth model is the primary new assumption compared to the lit-
erature. This new assumption drives the new findings: Firms try to protect their
assets (incremental inventors) from being made obsolete by disruptive innovation.
Successful producing firms can slow down technology disruption by hiring
the inventors that disruptive firms would need to innovate. Thus, some firms in
the economy actively resist technology growth. Technological progress depends
not only on investment in R&D, but also on overcoming this resistance. This
is the main mechanism that follows from the introduced assumptions and sets
this paper apart from the rest of the endogenous growth literature, which views
innovation as the result of investment only.
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The model can recreate the empirical trends documented in chapter 3:
 Patent invention rates are a function of both inventor skill and firm research
quality.
 Highly skilled inventors strongly sort to high quality research firms (corre-
lation 0.5-0.8).
 Assortative matching increases within technology clusters.
 Patents are highly concentrated within technology clusters.
 Aggregate productivity growth decelerates.
The model can reproduce an economy with similar developments: If producing
firms with a high research quality successfully poach all highly skilled inventors,
assortative matching is high. The bulk of inventions will be small and incremental
with a low productivity effect. However, the model also supports another equi-
librium with high assortative matching. In this second equilibrium, high quality
inventors work at disruptive firms and frequent disruptive inventions keep produc-
ers small and technology growth high. This equilibrium does not fit the observed
trends.
A fictitious social planner has to chose between these two equilibria. Which
of the two he would pick crucially depends on the weight that the social planner
puts on future generations: A disruptive invention will increase economic growth
long-term, but the benefits will accrue to future inventors and future firms. In
contrast, the current incremental inventors and producing firms unambiguously
lose after a disruptive invention. If the current agents die before the growth
increase from a disruptive innovation creates value, the social planner cannot
compensate them and the low-growth equilibrium with incremental innovations
is Pareto-optimal, even though it does not maximize GDP. If people in the model
live long enough, the social planner could use the additional GDP to compensate
the losers from a disruptive innovation.
A large literature is concerned with the growing dispersion of firm level pro-
ductivity (Gal et al., 2016) and declining aggregate productivity growth (Gordon,
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2016) throughout the developed world. The literature discusses several different
explanations for these phenomena:
Akcigit and Ates (2019) argue that slowing technology diffusion is itself the
most likely source of slowing technology growth. Lucking et al. (2019) argue
that technology diffusion is still about as fast as it was in the 1980s. However,
they do find that technology diffusion was faster during the growth acceleration
associated with IT in the 1990s. In my model, growth is driven by disruptive
innovation, while incremental inventions (and their diffusion) influence the level
of economic activity. However, the model I present also features an inventor-firm
labor market, which can serve as micro-foundation for technology diffusion in the
endogenous growth model.
Another school of thought argues that ideas are getting harder to find and
technology growth thus slows down endogenously. Gordon (2016) makes this
point. Bloom et al. (2017) showed that more and more researchers are neces-
sary to double e.g. computing power or crop yields per acre. My paper takes
this finding seriously, but offers an alternative interpretation: The very fact that
firms invest so many resources in solving the same problems using the same tech-
nologies indicates that they are engaged in incremental innovation. Thus, the
findings of Bloom et al. (2017) are troublesome because they show a misalloca-
tion of inventive talent to incremental innovation with declining returns. Yet,
this does not necessarily mean that disruptive ideas are becoming harder to find.
My model is built on the framework of Akcigit and Kerr (2018), who assume
that firms are proficient in specific technology clusters. I understand technology
clusters as more than just one new product, they denote distinct technologies
behind multiple individual products, like ”telegraphy” or ”internal combustion
engine”. Incremental inventions within these clusters generate higher quality
products. In departure from Akcigit and Kerr (2018), firms cannot invent on
their own and have to hire inventors specialized in a technology cluster on a
search and matching labor market. The labor market for inventors in each clus-
ter corresponds to the results presented in the empirical chapter in section 3.4.
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. Together, these factors determine the value of
an invention V (p) in equation (3.3).
My paper also speaks to a larger theoretical literature on market failures that
misdirect innovation. Firms under-invest in research that unlocks follow-up in-
ventions, because they cannot profit from the inventions other firms will make, as
in Hopenhayn et al. (2006); Denicolò (2000); Scotchmer (1991). In general, firms
can only appropriate a share of the overall welfare increases that result from their
inventions. Since this share is not constant across inventions, firms over-invest
in inventions where they can appropriate a high share of the returns (Bryan and
Lemus, 2017). In the model presented here, producing firms can only appropriate
the returns from incremental innovation, which drives aggregate behavior.
In a larger context, the paper relates to literature on the efficacy of the current
system to reward innovative firms. The theoretical and experimental literature
suggests that patents are not able to optimally steer the direction of innovation
in general: If only a finite number of research direction is available, firms race
each other to the most lucrative patents and incur wasteful parallel investment
(Zizzo, 2002; Silipo, 2005; Breitmoser et al., 2010). Both in the US (Jaffe, 2000)
and Japan (Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001), firms do not react conclusively
to substantial changes in patenting protection. Nevertheless, in my model, the
market failure can be corrected by policy interventions. Since technology monop-
olists are misdirecting innovation, policy should break up existing monopolies and
prevent mergers and buy-outs of start-ups. Likewise, any policy that increases
the transferability of inventor skills makes technology markets larger and thus
harder to monopolize.
Beyond the theoretical literature, there is substantial empirical support for
the monopolization of research fields, which is conceptually adjacent to the pro-
posed model: Thompson and Kuhn (2017) use patent races between firms to
compare the first and second research team and thus patent holders and follow-
ers. They find that patents preclude competitors from follow-up innovation and
make the winner of patent races more dominant in the associated technology
field. In the semiconductor industry, increased patent protection seems to have
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led to defensive patenting instead of innovation (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Across
industries, the correlation between patent protection and innovation is negative,
which Bessen and Maskin (2009) explain by the negative effect of patents on se-
quential inventions. This study extends the principal insights of this literature to
a context of inventor-firm labor market matching in an endogenous growth model.
This paper also links into the literature around the documented rise of firm
profits and markups (Barkai, 2017; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). The model
predicts that firms with high market power engage in qualitatively different R&D.
Only small, competitive firms invest in disruptive technology to – if successful –
themselves become large firms linked to a technology. After that, their research
portfolio will become much more incremental. These predictions could be tested
with firm level patent data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 lays out the
assumptions and mechanisms of the model. The section also discusses various
possibilities for extensions of the model and their implications. Section 4.3 dis-
cusses the policy implications of the model and the strategy of a social planner.
Section 4.4 concludes the analysis.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Research
The inventors who drive technological progress are at the heart of this endoge-
nous growth model. Inventors choose the firm they work with and the type of
innovation they pursue. Producing firms poach inventors from disruptive firms
to protect their technologies from disruption.
Technology is differentiated into broad fields or disciplines like ”telecommu-
nications” or ”electricity generation”. Within each of these fields, technology
clusters (following the terminology of Akcigit and Kerr, 2018) denote distinct
areas of knowledge like the clusters ”telegraphy” or ”satellite communications”
in the field ”telecommunications”. These clusters are areas of expertise for indi-
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vidual inventors, who cannot be experts in whole fields or even all sciences.
Firms cannot conduct research on their own and have to hire inventors. The
majority of inventors are specialists who studied one specific technology cluster
and are dedicated to improving it further. Every invention these incremental
inventors make increases the product quality of their firm, but does not change
the general technology structure. An example of incremental inventors are the
engineers who improve the internal combustion engine. Incremental inventors
cannot contribute to the economy if this technology becomes obsolete. Because
of this restriction, technology clusters play a large role in inventors’ and firms’
calculations. Throughout the rest of the paper, I will use the words cluster and
technology cluster interchangeably.
Occasionally, major breakthroughs in a technology field create an entirely
new, better technology cluster within the same field. An example are current
efforts to use gas, hydrogen or electric energy to power cars. If successful, elec-
tric cars would then form another technology cluster within the broader field of
”vehicle construction”. Disruptive inventions are proofs of concepts for better
technologies: The first telegraph, the first power line or the first electrical train
were not viable consumer products, but demonstrated the feasibility of the tech-
nology. Subsequent incremental innovations then create actual products that can
enter the market. Each cluster is better than the last one in the sense that it
enables more impactful incremental follow-up innovation.
Within each technology field, there exists a group of disruptive firms who aim
to create such breakthroughs. These firms do not sell any products, but employ
disruptive inventors to generate prototypes of future production technologies.
Whenever these firms are successful, a new technology cluster is born and the
old cluster becomes obsolete. Old incremental inventors can no longer contribute
to products based on the new technology, but disruptive inventors and firms can
immediately work on disrupting the new technology again. The disrupting firm
also founds a new producing firm which will use the newly created technology.
Clusters are indexed by their field and a running number c. Taking the field
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of telecommunication as an example, the telegraph might be c = 1, the tele-
phone might be c = 2 and so forth. Slightly abusing notation, I will drop the
index field for now, since all fields in the model are symmetrical and follow the
same logic. Thus, the index is only relevant when aggregating over the whole
economy. In the following, capitalized variables denote aggregate variables (like
the probability for disruption in a technology field Λdis) and lower case letters
describe microeconomic variables (like the number of patents for firm p nrpatentsp ).
Parameter notations follow precedents in the literature whenever possible.
The only point of disruptive inventions is to enable incremental follow-up
improvements. The quality that these incremental inventions generate rises the
higher the cluster. The quality improvement from one incremental invention is
∆q(c) = ωc (4.1)
where c denotes the number of the cluster. In the above example, an incremental
invention that improves the telegraph would generate ω1 additional quality for
the inventing firm. An incremental improvement of the telephone would create
ω2. Thus, parameter ω > 1 determines how substantial the gains from disruptive
inventions are: If ω = 1.20, a telephone improvement would generate 20% more
quality than a telegraph refinement.
4.2.2 Poaching Disruptive Inventors
There are two different types of inventors, who pursue different types of inven-
tions: First, there are incremental inventors who make improvements to the
existing technology of their employers. Second, there are disruptive inventors,
who generate the next technology cluster and found a producing firm with the
new technology.
The central conflict of the model is between producing and disruptive firms:
Producing firms fear technology disruptions and can poach disruptive inventors
to prevent disruption. While this behavior slows down technology growth, it also
protects the assets of producing firms: The value of an incremental firm comes
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from its patents, its current stock of inventors and the value of its future hires
Vp = nr
patents
p ∗V patent+V inventorsp (V patent, λinvp , r, δ,Λdis)+V hiresp (V patent, λinvp , r, δ,Λdis)
The first term denotes the stream of future profits that producing firm p can
derive from its incremental patents (nrpatentsp ). The assumptions about consumer
demand ensure that every patent has the same constant value V patent. Alter-
natively, one could also assume that patents are tradeable without costs, which
means that each patent must have the same value in equilibrium, no matter which
firm invented it. Patents do not expire and the product improvements they allow
carry over to the next technology cluster (as in Akcigit and Kerr, 2018), which
keeps the optimization problem of the producers simple. This assumption works
against the mechanism I propose in this paper: If patents were also invalidated
by disruption, producing firms would have even more reason to fear and prevent it.
The second term describes the value of the inventors that the firm currently
employs. It is a function of the value of a single patent V patent and the rate
at which the inventors of producing firm p create patents λinvp . This stream of
future patents is discounted with the interest rate r, the rate at which inventors
leave the economy δ and the rate at which disruptive inventions occur Λdis, since
disruptive inventions will make the stock of incremental inventors obsolete. The
specific functional form of the discount factor is determined by the equilibrium
evolution of Λdis.
The third term denotes the value a firm derives from the inventors it will
hire in the future. New producing firms can enter the economy at any point
by paying the entry fee fe and draw a research quality yp. Hence, the ex ante
expected value of hiring inventors in the future has to be fe. The ex post value
might be different, because firms know which research quality they have drawn
and high quality firms might profit more from hiring inventors. In this case, high
quality firms would have an additional incentive to prevent disruption. I take
the conservative approach and assume that hiring costs increase in quality, too.
This reduces the incentive for high quality firms to poach disruptive inventors
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and thus works against the central mechanism of the model. It also simplifies the
following calculations.
The rate of disruptive innovation affects the value of producing firm p through
the value of its inventor stock: Disruptive inventions do not affect the value of
patents (which do not become obsolete whenever a disruptive invention hits) and
they do not affect the value of inventors hired in the future (because even if the
value of future hires goes up, new firms will enter the market to take advantage,
reducing the stream of inventors that go to any one firm).
To protect their valuable stock of inventors, producing firms interfere in the
labor market for disruptive inventors. Each disruptive inventor that a producing
firm can secure will decrease the likelihood of disruption. Whenever one of the
poached disruptive inventors of firm p would have made a disruptive invention,
the firm has effectively saved its entire stock of incremental inventors. The motive
for poaching disruptive inventors thus is stronger the larger the producing firm
is. To be able to poach, the value of preventing disruptive inventions for the pro-
ducing firm must be higher than the value of the disruptive inventions themselves.
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dis)
∂Λdis
∗ f(λinvp , η) ≥ λdisi ∗ V disi (4.2)
The value of hindering disruptive inventions is a product of three terms. The
first term is the rate at which the inventor would have caused disruptions (λdisi ).
However, since more productive inventors would also create more inventions, λdisi
appears on both sides of the equation and does not affect the calculation of
whether or not to hire any specific inventor.
The second term denotes the amount by which the firms’ incremental inventors
increase in value if ΛDis falls: A lower probability of disruption does not increase
the number of patents that incremental inventors produce, but it increases the
expected time during which they can produce. This increases the value of each
inventor.
The third term f(.) captures the size of the firms’ research department measured
by the firms’ patent arrival rate λinvp and the possibility that it will grow in the
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future due to the rate of new hires η.
A poached disruptive inventor not only directly reduces the rate of disruptive
inventions today, but also has some option value: First, the rate of disruptive
inventions in the future might change, which would change how valuable the
inventor is. Second, firms might hire more incremental inventors and thus he
would be able to protect more assets from disruption. The functional form of
f(.) and even the proposition that V Disp can neatly be separated into a product
of the three terms depend on the evolution of Λdis and the size of a firm’s research
department over time.
This value of shutting down a disruptive inventor is related to the problem of
the social planner: The destruction of all incremental inventors is a social cost of
any disruptive invention. However, the social planner weighs it quite differently:
The social planner does
 not take into account the quality of any specific firm f(y): The social
planner will take into account the value of all obsolete inventors and thus
calculate with the average firm quality. Yet, even if this value is low, the
highest quality firms might already have incentives to hinder disruption.
 not take into account the loss of the stream of future inventors η. These
inventors are not lost to the economy, only to the no longer existing obsolete
firms.
 instead take into account the fact that future inventors are able to start in
a better technology cluster as a positive of disruption. However, already
existing firms are wedded to already existing technologies and cannot profit
from the future higher rate of technological progress.
To find the specific functional form of equation (4.2) and determine which
firms will poach how many disruptive inventors, I will now discuss the inventor
labor markets for incremental and disruptive inventors.
4.2.3 Labor Markets for Incremental Inventors
I model inventor labor markets as slightly simplified versions of standard search
and matching labor markets. Standard versions are not tractable outside of the
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steady state. Yet, it is a central feature of the model that disruptive inventions
upset the steady state and thus it is imperative that the value of inventors and
the equilibrium strategies remain manageable on the path towards a new steady
state. Thus, I make a few simplifying assumptions. I demonstrate that the qual-
itative results do not hinge on these assumptions whenever I introduce them.
The labor markets for incremental inventors bring together producing firms
who want to improve the quality of their product with fresh graduates from uni-
versity within each technology field.
New producing firms can be founded at any time in any frontier technology
cluster by paying the entry fee feω
c. Firms draw a research quality yp from a
uniform distribution. These firms then participate in the labor market for in-
cremental inventors for that cluster. The expected value of the stream of future
inventors net of the cost of vacancies will thus always equal feω
c, or additional
firms will enter.
Prospective incremental inventors leave university and enter the labor market
for each technology field at rate η. These graduates draw an ability xi and then
choose a technology cluster to specialize in. It is clearly optimal to choose the
most advanced technology cluster within each field: Even if there was a mar-
ket for improving obsolete technology, patents in more advanced clusters enable
larger productivity gains, boosting profits and wages.
Since graduates have to fit the research projects firms hire them for, they
cannot just start at any firm. Instead, graduates search for firms’ open vacan-
cies. In the standard search and matching labor market, η graduates enter the
economy at any point in time and become unemployed inventors. This builds
up a mass of unemployed inventors which slowly matches with firms or exits the
market again. If the economy is in steady state, the masses of graduating, un-
employed and employed inventors are constant. However, if the cluster was only
just created through a disruptive invention, this creates a complicated path to
the steady state (see e.g. Rogerson et al. (2005) or Hagedorn et al. (2017) for an
overview over popular modeling approaches).
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To simplify the equilibrium path outside of the eventual steady state, I as-
sume that graduates enter the labor market and immediately find a match among
the available vacancies. Unmatched inventors have to leave the economy because
they lose their connection to recent developments. The research avenues that are
represented by vacancies also become superseded by new approaches if they do
not match. This reduces the complexity of the labor market, because the mass
of unemployed inventors does not matter for the equilibrium anymore, since they
cannot contribute to the economy. This leads to the same steady state outcome,
but the path towards that steady state is much more tractable. Figure (4.1) de-
scribes the path towards labor market equilibrium after a disruptive innovation
for both specifications.
Figure 4.1: The graph shows the evolution of the number of incremental inventors
in a technology cluster after its foundation. Over time, more and more inventors
enter the cluster, until the steady state level is reached. The baseline specification
of the model is presented in black. The grey lines depict the stock of employed
and unemployed inventors in a more standard model for comparison. Such a
model has slightly less employed inventors early on, because inventors enter into
unemployment and leave it over time. However, not only do both models give
the same kind of path qualitatively, the two paths are also quantitatively close.
Assuming that inventors cannot be unemployed increases tractability without
greatly changing even the quantitative results.
How many vacancies firms will create in this setting depends on the value
of obtaining an additional inventor. This value is determined by the number of
patents the new inventor will produce and by how much of it the firm has to pay
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to the inventor.
Matched pairs of inventors and firms produce patents with probability λf ;i =
xi ∗ yf . A pair’s patenting probability is the product of inventor skill and firm re-
search quality, so matching good inventors and firms generates additional patents.
Inventors leave the economy at the exogenous rate δ.
Each incremental inventor represents a stream of future patents up until he
either becomes obsolete because of disruption or leaves the economy. These risks





Patent ∗ e−rttmax(i)dt = yfxiV inc(1, 1) (4.3)
where tmax(i) is the time the inventor becomes obsolete or leaves the economy,
whichever happens first. An inventor with a higher productivity has the same
risk, so the constant yfxiV
Patent can be factored out. Thus, the value of any
incremental inventor is a linear function of his patenting probability yfxiV
inc(1, 1)
and the value of an inventor with skill 1 working at a firm of quality 1. I will use
V inc(1, 1) as a reference throughout the model until the equilibrium value of an
inventor is solved for.
Since neither unemployed inventors nor unfilled vacancies can exist, neither
side has an outside option once an inventor has drawn a specific vacancy. Thus,
neither side of a match can credibly threaten the other to discard the match.
Thus, the match surplus of any potential match is
Sinc(yf , xi) = yfxi ∗ V inc(1, 1) (4.4)
While they are matched, the pair expects to produce yfxi patents. Each patent
within a technology cluster c can improve firm quality and profits by the same
amount, so all patents have the same value. The matched pair of firm and inventor
discounts this stream of patents with the probability that the inventor leaves the
economy δ, the time preference r and the probability that a disruptive invention
ends the entire cluster. After matching, the pair Nash-bargains over this surplus
and divides it so that firms receive share α and inventors receive (1−α) as wages.
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The value of the additional incremental inventor i for producing firm p is
V ip (yp, xi) = αypxi ∗ V inc(1, 1) (4.5)
The patent invention function is supermodular, so a highly skilled inventor is
even more valuable for a high quality firm. Conversely, matching with a high
quality firm yields more utility for a high quality inventor.
Firms create vacancies to attract inventors and gain an additional stream
of patents (eq. 4.5). Just like in the standard model, firms face a congestion
externality when creating their vacancies: A firm that creates another vacancy
increases the number of inventors it can expect to attract and decreases the
number of hires its competitors can secure. The aggregate number of new hires
is fixed, because every graduate draws one random vacancy. A producing firm p
gains η
N incv
hires for every vacancy and pays fixed cost 1
2
∗ cv ∗ v2p ∗ yp for all its
vacancies. Firms will create additional vacancies in an effort to get a larger share
of the available graduates until they have driven the value of creating vacancies
down to the costs:
cv ∗ vp ∗ yp = α ∗ yp
1
2
Sinc(1; 1) ∗ η
N incv
(4.6)
I.e. expected value of a new inventor for the firm E(V (yp;xi)) times the probabil-
ity of obtaining an additional inventor when creating an additional vacancy η
N incv
must equal the marginal costs of creating an additional vacancy cv ∗ vp ∗ yp. The
value of an additional inventor drives how many vacancies firms actually create,
but does not influence the number of matches, since all graduates are guaranteed
to draw a vacancy. The value of future hires and the number of hired inventors
is independent of yp, which is on both sides of the equation and cancels out.
Note that equation (4.6) stipulates that the number of vacancies is linear in
yp. This means that higher quality firms will create more vacancies and thus
also obtain linearly more inventors at every point in time. Integrate equation
(4.6) over yp to get the average number of vacancies per firm, which yields the
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equilibrium number of vacancies as:
N incv = (α ∗
1
2





The number of vacancies will rise the higher the share of profits that go to firms,
the higher the surplus from acquiring an additional inventor and the higher the
number of firms. However, none of these factors drive up the number of vacan-
cies linearly: Additional vacancies become less and less valuable for firms as each
vacancy competes against all already existing vacancies for inventors.
The aggregate number of inventors and the rate of incremental inventions
do not depend on the number of vacancies created: All inventors draw an open
vacancy and will accept it. All firms create the same number of vacancies and thus
receive the same number of new inventors yp
N incf















where the first term describes the number of inventors at time tc (counting time
from the point in time the cluster was created through a disruptive invention).
Since η inventors enter the economy at each point in time and a share δ of the
existing inventors leave, this amounts to η
δ
(1 − e−δtc). The integrals describe
the average productivity of the inventors of the cluster, spread evenly across
firms. The distribution of inventors to firm does not change over time. More
involved labor markets are certainly possible, but would not change anything
fundamental about the model: A labor market such as the one described in
chapter 3 would complicate the formulas, but would in the end create a similar
equation to equation (4.8).
The inventor portfolio of the technology cluster grows fastest right after a
disruptive invention has created the technology cluster. At this point, η matches
are formed with new graduates from university, and no old matches are dissolved
because none exist. All old inventors belong to the previous, now outdated tech-
nology cluster. The inventor portfolio grows more slowly over time, because more
and more matches exist and the inventors in these matches leave the economy at
rate δ. This dampens net growth. At N inci (tc) =
η
δ
, the number of leaving and
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the number of entering inventors is equal. The technology cluster will reach this
steady state equilibrium after an infinite time – provided no disruptive invention
destroys it.
The value of all incremental inventors of firm p is defined by the aggregate
rate of inventions in its technology cluster Λinc(tc), the share of these inventions
that firm p participates in and the value of these inventions.




∗ α ∗ V inc(1; 1) (4.9)
The value of producing firms is increasing in Λinc(tc): As the aggregate stock of
inventors increases over time, producing firms will become more valuable. The
higher the number of competitors N incp , the lower the share of the overall in-
cremental inventions made by firm p. Since yp makes the firm’s inventors more
productive, it increases the share of patents that go to firm p. Higher quality
firms thus have a higher stake in the incremental inventor labor market and also
have a higher incentive to hinder disruptive inventions.
Since a firm with research quality 0 does not produce any patents, it will have
no incentive to dampen disruptive inventions. At any point in time, there will
be a marginal firm with quality ys which is just not interested in matching with
disruptive inventors and poaching them: The value gain from slowing down dis-
ruptive inventions for this firm equals the wage the firm has to pay the disruptive
inventor. All firms with a research quality above this sclerosis threshold ys will
be interested in poaching disruptive inventors, while all firms with lower research
quality will see poaching as a money losing proposition.
4.2.4 Labor Markets for Disruptive Inventors
Producing firms can inhibit disruptive innovation on the labor market for dis-
ruptive inventors. This is the central feature that sets my model apart from the
literature. E.g., incumbent firms in Akcigit and Kerr (2018) have a portfolio of
patents that is at risk from disruptions, but they have no way to prevent dis-
ruption. Labor markets provide a plausible way through which firms can hinder
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their competitors’ innovation.
In every technology field, a stock of disruptive inventors creates disruptive
inventions at rate Λdis(0). This stock of inventors is poached by the producing
firms over time and stops creating disruptive inventions. If the technology field
experiences a disruption, producing firms are destroyed; disruptive inventors are
freed and start disrupting again. When a disruptive inventor leaves the economy
(at rate δ), a member of the same household succeeds him and matches with the
last firm the leaving inventor was working for. Disruptive inventors in the each
found their own disruptive firm. This reduces the complexity of the labor market
for disruptive inventors without any impact on the poaching efforts of producing
firms, which drive the behavior of the model.
Each disruptive inventor draws his own λdisi from a uniform distribution be-
tween 0 and 1. Whenever a disruptive inventor is successful, he will create a new
producing firm. This firm will be in the previously unavailable cluster c+ 1 and
thus be worth ωc+1fe: New clusters feature more valuable incremental inventions.
The firm will not be a monopolist, since other firms can now enter the new cluster
freely. Nonetheless, the successful disruptive inventor will effectively have gained
the entry fee into the unavailable cluster.
The incentive to poach inventors on the disruptive labor markets is governed
by
 the value of the portfolio of incremental inventors (eq. 4.9)
 the costs of poaching inventors
 and whether poaching causes new disruptive inventors to enter the economy
(e.g. because wages for disruptive inventors increase).
To capture these three mechanisms in a simple labor market, I apply a reduced
form approach. A firm that wants to poach inventors has to create vacancies.
The costs of creating such vacancies rise because the different poaching firms
sometimes meet on the market and because they attract additional disruptive
inventors if they offer high wages to them. The cost of creating a vacancy that
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actually leads to a decline in Λdis thus is:
cv = feω




The first term equals the costs of creating a vacancy similar to section 4.2.3.
Costs rise with the returns from disruptive inventions fe ∗ ωc and the research
quality of the firm yp. Hence, low and higher quality firms will again create the
same number of vacancies, all else being equal.
The second term represents the congestion externality if there are many disrup-
tive firms trying to poach inventors: With probability ys, a producing firm will
not poach on the disruptive market. The fewer producing firms actually poach,
the easier it is for the remaining producing firms. E.g. if ys = 0.5, half of all
producing firms in the economy poach and costs double because disruptive firms
will have to effectively create two vacancies to still match with the same number
of disruptive inventors.
The third term represents the offer that poaching firms have to make: Producing
firms have to match the wage that disruptive inventors can earn themselves in
order to poach them. However, if producing firms make generous offers to dis-
ruptive inventors, it becomes more attractive to become a disruptive inventor.
Additional vacancies become necessary to decrease the number of disruptive in-
ventors as the ratio between the discounted earnings of disruptive inventors in
producing firms and the current wage of disruptive inventors increases.
This setup for the careers of disruptive inventors contains two non-standard
assumptions: First, that new disruptive inventors ”inherit” the spot of a leaving
”mentor”-inventor. As long as no producing firms interfere in the labor market,
this is equivalent to the more standard ”randomly drawn firm” assumption. If
producing firms do interfere, this assumption does not affect the qualitative dis-
tribution of inventors, but makes the model more tractable: Since new inventors
enter firms according to the currently existing distribution and not a random
draw, the distribution changes slightly faster and it is not necessary to keep track
of the deviation between the current distribution of disruptive inventors and a
random allocation. Second, the reduced form assumptions about the labor mar-
kets for disruptive inventors are non-standard, but they make it harder for firms
to poach inventors and thus work against the model mechanism. They condense
84 CHAPTER 4. INVENTOR LABOR MARKET & GROWTH
the forces working against the main mechanism into an easy formula and allow
me to include them into the model without it becoming intractable. This way
avoids fully fleshing out a whole other labor market for inventors that are on the
fence about becoming disruptive inventors or not.
To actually solve the model, I will use the guess-and-verify method of solving
intertemporal optimization problems. I guess that the equilibrium path of the
rate of disruptive inventions Λdis is
Λ̇dis = −(r + δ + 1
2
Λdis) ∗ Λ (4.11)
So the rate of technology disruption goes down faster as Λdis is still high,
i.e. right after a disruptive invention. As Λdis approaches zero and the risk goes
down, Λ̇dis converges towards 0 from above. (r + δ + 1
2
Λdis) can be read as the
rate contraction of the arrival rate of disruptive inventions.
Inserting the rate of contraction of Λdis into the value of an incremental in-






Thus, the value of a disruptive inventor for a producing firm becomes
V disi (λ
dis












+ λincp (δ + r)
(2δ + r)(δ + r)
] (4.12)
I.e. the value of an incremental inventor lies in how many disruptive inven-
tions he would have made (λdisi ) times the value gain of an incremental inventor
if the rate of disruption declines (first fraction) times a weighted average of the
inflow of future inventors η
N incp
and the current stock of incremental inventors.
To arrive at the sclerosis threshold ys, compare this to the expected value of
getting the returns from disruptive inventions. This yields
ys =
1
V disi (1, 1)
ωfe




To see how much firms poach in equilibrium, insert equation (4.13) into equa-
tion (4.10) and compare these costs to the gains from poaching an inventor. This
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yields the equilibrium rate of poaching for producing firms:
ρv =
1




Producing firms will create additional vacancies until the probability that a





standard match production function (m = (Λdis ∗ v) 12 ), the rate of poaching that




Since the rate of contraction for Λdis contains Λdis, this is a first order differ-
ential equation. Solving it yields Λdis as a function of time:








The equilibrium arrival rate starts at Λdis(0) and declines over time as the de-
nominator gets larger. In infinite time, the arrival rate will be 0. c is a constant
that is fully determined by Λdis(0).
4.2.5 Consumer Demand, Patent Value and Static Profits
Throughout the previous discussion, I assumed that patents yield a steady stream
of profits equal to a constant π times the quality increase that each patent rep-
resents.
This assumption can be microfounded in a number of ways, most notably
as in Akcigit and Kerr (2018). In their model, firms sell their products to a
love-of-variety final goods sector and profits only depend on product quality and
exogenous demand & cost parameters. As is standard in these settings, firms
compete against the (appropriately weighted) average product in the market and
not any specific firms. For the baseline specification of this paper, I present a
close derivative of this model where I increase the role of technology clusters and
introduce technology fields.
86 CHAPTER 4. INVENTOR LABOR MARKET & GROWTH
I also present an alternative specification of consumer demand that also leads
to profits linear in quality. This is to emphasize that the specifics of demand do
not drive my conclusions and labor markets are tractable enough so that they
can be inserted in different GE-models. This alternative justification of linear
profits is based on a Salop circle demand framework. In this framework, every
firm competes against specific firms (its neighbors on the circle), which opens up
the possibility to extend the model for strategic interactions between different
firms.
Baseline specification
Consumers are part of a representative household and derive logarithmic utility






Consumers are impatient (r). They neither face a tradeoff between leisure and
consumption, nor do they experience inequality. Households evenly share income
from all sources between their members.
A final goods industry produces the consumption good from labor and a











where qj is the quality of good j, zj is its quantity and Lc(t) is the labor expended
in final goods production. If all product qualities are fixed, the production func-
tion exhibits constant returns to scale in labor and intermediate inputs. With
increasing product qualities qj, the production function exhibits increasing re-
turns to scale.
Each product j corresponds to a technology field. To become a producing
firm for product j, firms enter the current frontier technology cluster in that field
and hire inventors.
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The economy contains a mass 1 of production workers which I will call tech-
nicians. Technicians have undergone vocational training and cannot become in-
ventors. However, they can contribute to the production of any good, regardless
of the specific technology. Since all technicians are perfect substitutes and firms’
research quality does not matter for production, no matching is necessary. There
is a perfectly competitive spot market for technicians’ labor without search costs.
The final goods industry is a price taker, consisting of a multitude of small
competing firms. Hence, its inverse demand for any one intermediate good is
pj = L
β





The price that the final goods industry is willing to accept for variety j of the
intermediate good increases as more technicians work in the final goods industry
Lc(t) and the quality of the variety becomes higher. If the final goods industry
buys a higher quantity zj, the acceptable price declines.
In each of these intermediate goods sectors j, producing firms compete to




Firms use one unit of labor to produce one unit of an intermediate good of aver-
age quality.
As is standard in the literature, these firms compete in a two-stage Bertrand
game: In stage one, every firm decides whether it wants to incur an arbitrarily
small set-up cost ε to be able to produce. In stage two, all remaining firms engage
in Bertrand competition. Since the result of Bertrand competition will be that
only the firm with the highest quality produces, only this firm will incur the cost
ε and it will be the monopolist in the second stage of the game.
A single monopolist with a given product quality will set the profit maximizing
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price and produce quantity






Importantly, demand for the monopolist’s products depends on the amount of
labor employed in the final goods industry since production workers process the
intermediate inputs.
The mass of small firms in the final goods sector will optimize their labor and
intermediate goods intake and through this set the wage rate. Optimizing equa-
tion (4.16) with respect to labor and inserting the equilibrium on the intermediate
goods market (equation 4.17) gives the optimal wage as
w = ββ(1− β)1−2β ∗ q̄ (4.18)
i.e. the final goods industry will adjust its labor demand to achieve a wage rate
as a multiple of the average quality q̄ in the economy. The precise multiple is
dictated by labor’s output elasticity β. This behavior is optimal because the
supply of intermediate varieties is itself a function of Lc(t) (equation 4.17).
Producing firms make the important decisions in the model, since their deci-
sions about hiring inventors will determine technological progress and dynamic
equilibrium. However, their downstream decisions have no dynamic component:
Labor input, quantity sold and price can be adjusted at any point in time. Taking
into account that the final goods industry will always fix the wage rate (equation
4.18), the optimal quantity decision for a producing firm gives equilibrium profits
as
π∗mon = qj ∗ Lc(t) ∗ (1− β) ∗ ββ(1− β)1−2β (4.19)
Thus, a monopolist’s profits are a linear function of quality and (from the view-
point of the firm) an exogenous factor called π throughout the rest of the paper.
So far, this framework is deviating from the setup in Akcigit and Kerr (2018)
in two ways: First, I introduce technology fields, equate them with products and
prohibit producing firms from creating disruptive inventions. Together, these
changes mean that producing firms no longer face a general threat of disruption
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from firms throughout the whole economy. Instead, only a distinct set of disrup-
tive inventors within their own technology field pose a threat to producing firms.
Second, there are now multiple producing firms within one technology cluster.
As in Akcigit and Kerr (2018), incremental inventions increase product quality,
but I now have to make some assumptions about how producing firms split the
revenues and how this is affected by new inventions. To keep the model tractable,
I will assume that incremental inventions are unique, non-substitutable and ad-
ditive. Hence, a producing firm that makes an incremental invention will not
necessarily displace the current best product as in most ladder models, but just
gain ωc product quality. I assume that all producing firms within a technology
cluster then pool all their patents to create the best possible product and split
the revenues from selling that product according to the quality contribution that
each firm was able to make with its patents. Since all inventions are unique and
non-substitutable, market power lies with whoever holds each individual patent,
who can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the pool of the other firms. Thus, each
producing firm can extract the value of its patents, no matter which firm will
actually produce.
Using the HJB, the value of the firm’s patent portfolio is:




The value of the patent portfolio of a firm thus only depends on the impatience
to consume r and ∆qf , the quality improvement that this patent portfolio makes
possible. For simplicity, patents do not expire. Importantly, the value of a patent
portfolio is independent of the number of researchers in any firm.
This assumption is unusual insofar as the typical quality ladder model would
assume that a successful incremental invention creates a product one step above
the currently existing one. Instead, in my model, an invention represents an qual-
ity improvement that any firm in the cluster could in principle use to improve
their product. If the firm is not currently producing, it can license the invention
to the currently producing firm to increase the quality of their product further.
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Possible Alternative: Salop Circle
This section describes a completely different demand system that nevertheless
gives the same result of profits being a linear function of quality. The purpose of
this section is to demonstrate the flexibility of the inventor labor market setup
and to showcase a setup in which firms have direct competitors which could be
used for model extensions with strategic interactions between firms. To avoid
confusion with the baseline specification, I will index firms f and consumers con
in this section.
Consumers derive utility from a generic numeraire good a that represents
consumer goods with low research content. In addition, they derive utility from
satisfying a continuum of their needs located on a Salop circle of circumference
1. The needs on this circle are more advanced and can only be fulfilled with
research intensive products. Needs that are located closer to each other are more
substitutable. E.g., a section of the circle might represent different modes of
transportation, while another section might signify entertainment. In the trans-
portation section, one point might represent short distance trips for one person,
another point might represent longer commutes and a more distant point might
be intercontinental travel. Crucially, these are general needs and not existing
products.








Utility comes from the amount of goods purchased (xn) for each need, from the
quality of the products (qf ) for each need and from the distance between this need
and the product that the consumer actually bought (dn→f(n)). Since each point
on the circle represents a need and not a product, consumers have to search for
the best product to meet any specific need. The Cobb-Douglas utility function
implies that consumers spend a fixed share of their income on research intensive
goods, spread equally over their continuum of needs. In effect, consumers assign
a constant budget to any of their needs n on the circle.
There is only a finite number of firms, each of which produces exactly one prod-
uct. Firms and thus also products will be indexed with f . Firms have to position
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themselves on the circle and will attract customers intent on satisfying their needs
in the vicinity. E.g. a firm might decide to rent out bicycles suited for short dis-
tance trips. However, this firm’s product might also be the best option for longer
commutes if the bike has a high quality (e.g. an electric engine), if there are no
competing products in the vicinity (e.g. because the only other transportation
firm is an airline), or if the firm is charging a comparatively low price.
Consumers will buy a firm’s product multiple times: They will search for the best
offer for any one of their needs. E.g., consumers will search for the best firm for
short trips and then again search for the best firm for commutes. The success
of a firm f depends on for how many of these different needs it can make the
best offer. Consumers are indifferent to a product of double the quality which is
twice as far away from the desired variety. The quality and quantity of variety v
are complements and the consumer derives utility from their joint consumption.
Thus, the lower the price of the research intensive good, the more the consumer
can buy, which again makes the quality of the research intensive good more useful
to him.
From the viewpoint of firms, each need n is a separate winner-takes-all market
of equal size I ∗β. How many of these markets a firm wins determines its revenue
and size. Firms will always be able to control the markets closest to them because
quality is divided by the distance of the firm to the market
qf
dn→n . Thus, any firm
can offer infinite utility in the market at its location. Demand for the product
of firm f is determined by the marginal market nm;f ;f+1, i.e. the market where












Additionally, product f competes with product f − 1 on the other side of f . The
number of markets that firm f can capture depends on the quality of its product
(qf ) and the pricing and location decisions of its competitors.
In static equilibrium, firm f has to take the quality of its product as given.
It first sets prices and then positions itself on the circle, considering the fixed
quality of its competitors. Firm f will have to take the quality of all firms into
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account when setting prices, anticipating that the prices it sets will affect where
its competitors position themselves.
E.g., consider a bicycle, a car and a train company all competing for markets
in the transportation sector. The car company has to do research to increase
the quality of the cars it can produce, set a price and then decide whether it
would like to compete for short-distance inner-city trips with bicycles or for long-
distance traveling with trains. Setting a low, competitive price will induce both
the bicycle and the train competitor to move more into their specific niches, as
will having a high quality product.
Thus, every firm owner has to position the firm taking all other variables as
given. Solving equation (4.22) for the number of markets firm f captures to its
left (against firm f − 1) and to its right (against firm f + 1) yields the profits the
owner of firm f can reap:












Given that the firm owner has already set prices, maximizing profits now comes




is given. Note that the firm owner conceptually could influence
dnm;f−1;f by moving firm f closer to firm f − 1 and taking its markets.
The markets that f and f + 1 capture between them have to sum up to the
distance between the two firms, so the profits of firm f can be expressed only in
exogenous variables and the strategy choices of its competitors:



















where the term in brackets denotes the markets won by firm f : df→f+1 is the
distance between firm f and its competitor f + 1. The two firms split the mar-














. In the same way, firm f and firm f−1 share the markets between them.
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From equation (4.24), it is clear that there is no Nash equilibrium if firm f − 1
and firm f +1 have different qualities and prices: Firm f will always move to the
firm that offers the stronger product. However, Salop circles do not have Nash
equilibria in general. An equilibrium is only possible if firms take the location
reaction of their competitors into account.
Consider the reactions of firm f+1 to the actions of firm f . Because firm f+1
can freely move on the circle, its profits must be independent of f . Otherwise,
the firm will costlessly move to a different part of the circle. Firm f +1 will react
to any price and quality changes of f to restore this indifference.
∂πf+1
∂lf












































= 1 as the solution: If firm f moves 0.1 units closer to
firm f + 1, f + 1 will also move 0.1 units towards f + 2. Firm f + 1 can do this
because it expects firm f + 2 (and f + 3, f + 4,...) to do the same, restoring the
original positioning.
Now consider the case where firm f has set a higher price. Again, firm f + 1
cannot profit from that, since otherwise firms from other parts of the circle would















I.e., by increasing its price, firm f captures a slightly smaller share of the mar-
kets between f and f + 1. f + 1 then moves closer so as to exactly maintain the
number of markets it captures itself. Two firms share the markets between them
according to the ratio of the attractiveness of their products. So when f becomes
less attractive because of price increases, firm f + 1 has to move closer to shorten
the distance between the two firms. If the price of product f was already high,
f only has a tiny share of the contested markets and additional price increases
only require small changes in location. Even though this movement lowers its
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profits, firm f + 1 has to do this to protect itself against other firms moving into
the resulting gap.
Equations (4.25) and (4.26) imply that the utility of the marginal consumer
between two firms is constant across the economy. Intuitively, this follows more
or less directly from the free movement condition: Since the profits of firm f
depend directly on its own quality, its price and the utility of the marginal con-
sumers it can still capture (4.23), it stands to reason that one spot on the circle
cannot have marginal consumers with higher utility, since firms would otherwise
move there. Thus, I denote the sum of the utility of the two marginal consumers
of each firm as C. C is a competition parameter describing how low firms have
to set prices to stave off competing firms. It rises with how many firms of a given
quality are in the economy.
Mathematically, inserting C into equation (4.23), firm profits are













where Df denotes the number of captured markets, i.e. the number of markets
for which the product of f is the best product. Firms earn Iβ per captured
market, but the costs of servicing these markets increase non-linearly, because
lowering prices forces a firm to serve its already captured markets with more
produce or leave revenue on the table. Equation (4.27) takes into account that
firm f expects its neighboring firms to keep their profits and thus the fractions in
equation (4.23) constant. Thus, if f increases its price, f expects the other firms
to move closer, tightening competition compared to equation (4.24). Likewise, if
firm f decreases its price, it expects to cater to additional markets partly because
its direct competitors move away and partly because its products become more
attractive.
Maximizing equation (4.27) yields




for the optimal price: Firms charge a fixed markup over marginal costs depend-
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ing on the demand parameter β, which denotes how long additional quantity still
generates value for the customers for any given variety. If additional quantity
does not lead to much additional utility, firms cannot gain many customers by
lowering prices and charge a high markup.
Given this pricing behavior, customers search for the best product for each





Serviced markets are a linear function of a firm’s quality, given that every firm
charges the same price, regardless of its quantity. The number of markets served
reacts more strongly to quality if the marginal costs are small, so that the costs
of serving additional markets do not matter so much. The effect of the demand
parameter β is more ambiguous, because a high β raises the costs of servicing a
new market (because consumers demand more goods), but also means that con-
sumers spend more in each market. Firms leverage their quality to service more
markets, not to raise their prices. Since the circumference of the Salop circle is
finite, this is a predatory strategy: High quality firms push out their competitors.
Since only the number of served markets rises with quality, profits are also
linear in quality:










Every firm faces the same marginal costs and charges the same price, thus prof-
its in every market are the same (Iβ ∗ 1
1+β
). Profits per market are higher if β
increases, because consumers allot a higher budget to each need. This is partly
counteracted because a higher β also means that consumers draw more utility
from the quantity that firms produce, which harms firms: Since consumers value
lower prices, firms try to steal each others’ markets by lowering prices. Yet, the
higher overall spending for the research intensive good prevails.
Equilibrium requires that the whole circle is serviced, i.e.
∑
Df = 1. This
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allows to solve for the equilibrium value of competition strength [C] = 1∑
qf f
(1 +
β)βmcβ. The strength of equilibrium competition is rising in the sum of all
qualities of active firms: Since every firm captures markets on the Salop circle
in relation to their quality, if there are more high quality firms, every firm has
to receive a smaller number of markets. Marginal costs lower the competition
each firm feels, because higher marginal costs decrease the incentive for each
firm to spread out over multiple markets. Given the level of competition, firms









f Iβ(1 + β)
−1.
The economy is closed by the labor market and the market for the numeraire
good. The economy produces the numeraire good with the fixed amount of labor
L with the technology of all firms
∑
qf . Thus, the research intensive sector
increases the productivity of the numeraire sector. Since the numeraire sector is
competitive, its whole revenue is earned by its laborers. Thus, the equilibrium
income in the economy is
I =
∑
qfL(1 + β) (4.31)
i.e., the labor income from the numeraire sector plus the profits from the firms
in the research intensive sector. Labor income increases the higher the produc-
tivity of the economy and the more labor L households supply. The higher β,
the higher the profit share of the economy, as well as nominal income for a given
productivity level. However, a higher β would also lead to higher prices for the
research intensive good, so real income is not rising.
Given this nominal income level, the profit of any given firm is
πf = qf ∗ β (4.32)
and thus is only a function of a firm’s product quality qf and the constant param-
eter β. However, potential entrants do not only care about current conditions,
but are motivated by potential future profits. Thus, the number of firms in
equilibrium is determined by future prospects for quality improvements through
research.
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Within a cluster currently at the technology frontier, i.e. a cluster that is the
best in its field, patents improve the product quality of firms and thus represent
a steady stream of profits for the firm that holds them. The value of a patent




is a function of parameters of the model and thus fixed. It rises with c, as
patents in more advanced clusters create more quality (parameter ω determines
the strength of this effect). The value of a patent also rises in β, which governs
the markups of firms and the amount of money consumers spend on the research
intensive good.
Given this value of patents, the value of an inventor is the stream of patents














dxi = yfVf (N
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I.e. the value of the patent portfolio of firms is increasing in yf because high
quality firms produce more patents with the inventors they have. The value of a
firm’s patent portfolio increases as long as the current technology cluster is still
on the edge and additional inventors are still entering the cluster.
A potential entrant does not have an inventor portfolio, but expects to hire
inventors in the future. The value of this stream is dependent on the research
quality yf the entrant will draw.





(ηxi ∗ Vf (yf ;xi) dxi
1
r + Λdis
= yfVf (yf = 1) (4.35)
The stream of inventors matched with firms of quality y is shared between all
firms of that quality 1
Nf (y)
. Again, the value of the stream of hires is increasing in
yf because a higher quality firm gets more patents out of each hire. If the value
of a patent in the technology cluster V (pc) is higher, firms value the stream of in-
ventors they will hire more. The share of profits flowing to the firm makes future
inventors more valuable, too. The likelihood of disruptive inventions decreases
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the value of future inventors: If a disruptive invention occurs, new inventors will
not enter the now obsolete cluster of the firm. The stream of hires will dry up.
Whenever a new technology cluster is created (and only then), new firms
can enter. New firms entering the economy do not yet have inventors or patents.
However, entrants gain access to the inventor labor market and will hire inventors
and produce patents in the future. Firms pay an entry fee fe to become experts
in a technology cluster proportional to ωc: The more disruptive inventions were
necessary to form the cluster, the more sophisticated the technology is and the
more setup is necessary. In equilibrium, the ex ante expected value of future












Since entrants draw a quality yf randomly from a uniform distribution between 0
and 1, there is an equal mass of entrants (and firms) at every quality Nf (y). The
expected value of entry declines as more firms enter, because a higher number of
entrants compete for a fixed number of graduates. However, the value of entry
is independent of patents or the inventors already in the cluster. Hence, firms
will enter as soon as the disruptive invention creates the cluster and drive the
expected returns from entering down to the entry fee fe.
Some firms will ex post regret entering: They draw a bad research quality and
do not make enough profits to recoup their entry costs. Using equation (4.35),




worse will not recoup fe. These firms will not exist, since there is no continuous
cost of operation apart from inventor wages. Thus, such firms will participate in
the search for inventors and hire those with which they can recover at least some
part of their entry fee.
4.2.6 Technological Progress
Technological progress in the economy is twofold: Incremental inventions improve
the average quality of the products in the economy and ultimatively increase the
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utility of consumers. Disruptive progress increases the value of future incremental
progress. In equilibrium, disruptive innovation declines from the maximum to 0,
while the number of incremental inventions converges from 0 to the maximum.
In equilibrium, the economy still grows as new incremental inventions increase
quality, but economic growth as a percentage of GDP declines because incremen-
tal inventions can only create linear growth.
Each frontier technology cluster in each technology field faces a chance of dis-
ruption Λdis, upon which a new, more valuable technology cluster emerges. The
rate of disruptive inventions is declining as more and more disruptive inventors
get poached by producing firms (4.15). For any specific technology field, this
creates a saw blade like graph of the rate of disruption (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Example of the path of two technology fields or sectors of the econ-
omy. Sector A experienced several disruptive inventions which create a saw blade
pattern: After every disruptive invention, all producing firms close down and
poached disruptive inventors become active again. The probability for further
disruptive inventions goes up to the maximum rate again. Then producing firms
start poaching inventors again to decrease this rate. Sector B did not make a
disruptive invention at the beginning and the chances decreased as time went on,
because most disruptive inventors were already poached. In the end, the sector
did not experience any disruptive inventions before it arrived at the no-disruption
equilibrium.
The whole economy consists of many such sectors and is thus not subject
to the randomness of any one sector. The expected change in Λdis for any one
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technology field or sector is
E(∆Λdis) = Λdis(Λdis(0)− Λdis)− Λdis(r + δ + 1
2
Λdis) (4.37)
The first term describes that with probability Λdis, a disruptive invention will
occur and set Λdis to Λdis(0). The second term encapsulates the poaching ef-
forts of producing firms, which will decrease the rate of disruptive inventions by
Λdis(r + δ + 1
2
Λdis). Note that the rate of disruptive inventions is clearly declin-
ing for every value of Λdis as long as Λdis(0) < r + δ. This restriction will hold
in most real world applications: Hobijn and Şahin (2009) estimate a separation
rate of around 1.5% for the average OECD country, which together with a real
interest rate of a conservative 2% would imply that the average sector of the econ-
omy stays undisrupted for 18 years or more. Even if this parameter restriction
is violated, the qualitative result remains, but it becomes much harder to show
analytically. Appendix I details the results of the empirical simulation.
The exact parameters notwithstanding, it is clear from equation (4.37) that
the only possible equilibrium for any one sector is that the rate of disruptive
inventions is zero: It is the only point where both the expected change and the
change in case of no disruptive inventions are zero, so the technology field will
never leave this point. Any technology field will thus eventually experience the de-
cline of disruptive inventions to zero, even if Λdis(0) is very high. More and more
technology fields will be stuck in this equilibrium, until eventually all of them are.
Nevertheless, incremental inventors will add to the product quality of pro-
ducing firms at each point in time. How much quality they add to the economy
depends on the technology cluster they are in: Technology fields with large in-
ventor portfolios and more disruptive inventions in the past will contribute more
quality increases (equation 4.8). Technological progress through incremental in-









I.e., progress is a function of the number of inventors in that cluster and the
quality increase that an incremental invention in the frontier cluster of the field
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creates.
Technological progress in a field changes as additional inventors enter the field,
old inventors leave and disruptive inventions make the whole stock of inventors
obsolete:
E( ˙∆qc(tec)) = ω
c ∗ η1
6
− δ∆qc(tec)− Λdis∆qc(tec) (4.39)
If no disruptive invention happens, the frontier cluster will eventually absorb all
inventors in the field. At this point, technological progress will be linear, as each
inventor produces a set amount of inventions, each of which adds a fixed amount
of quality ωc. This is the steady state outcome: The rate of disruption will even-
tually decline to 0 and after that, all inventors will eventually work in that cluster
as (tec)→∞.
Figure 4.3: The path towards the steady state of the economy. The solid black line
denotes the number of disruptive inventions at each point in time for a simulated
economy with 2000 sectors. The dotted line denotes the theoretically expected
number. Evidently, while there is still some randomness, the actual number of
inventions tracks the predicted line quite closely. The rate of disruptive inventions
decreases as more and more disruptive inventors get poached by producing firms.
As that happens, the aggregate rate of quality growth in the economy slows down
until linear growth is reached in the steady state.
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4.3 Description of Equilibrium and Policy Im-
plications
The economy presented in the baseline specification has several major decision
points, only some of which the market economy handles efficiently.
First, there is the demand of the final goods sector for intermediate products
to turn into the final consumer product. The economy has a fixed number of
products defined by how many technology fields there are and all of them are
produced in equilibrium. However, the quantity produced is smaller than in the
optimum because of the monopoly power of intermediate goods producers. This
inefficiency depresses output by a fixed share, but has no impact on equilibrium
growth rates.
Second, intermediate goods producers have to hire incremental inventors to im-
prove their product. Producers hire all incremental inventors by assumption
(because new graduates are guaranteed to draw a job). So, there is no ineffi-
ciency in this dimension.
Third, disruptive inventors work on disrupting the economy and get poached
by producing firms to prevent this. The market economy weighs the costs of
disruptive inventions against the entry costs for producing firms: A successful
disruptive inventor is not able to appropriate all the benefits from his invention
as profits because other entrepreneurs can enter the new technology cluster that
he has created. Producing firms bear all costs from disruption and receive none
of the benefits, thus they have a strong incentive to prevent disruption. A social
planner that maximizes the utility of representative households makes a very dif-
ferent calculation: He weighs the value of getting graduates empowered by the
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Firms do not make this calculation since the value of the future inventors that
other firms will get does not factor into their profits. It is apparent that a social
planner might even arrive at the same conclusion as the market economy if the
discount rate is sufficiently high: Empowering future graduates takes longer to
pay off than current incremental inventions.
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This highlights an important point about the tradeoffs involved in the decision
about which type of research to pursue: Increasing long run economic growth in
this model requires unambiguously hurting the current generation. The currently
living incremental inventors and firms have a vested interest in slowing economic
growth. Fast productivity growth through disruption does not benefit them, but
the inventors and firms who will enter the newly created cluster. A social plan-
ner might want to solve this via transfers, but even that might not work: The
current stock of incremental inventors is made obsolete, temporarily decreasing
GDP. While it will eventually be rebuilt and growth will increase, many incre-
mental inventors and firm owners that were hurt by the disruption will already
have left the economy. Effectively, the current generations prefer to increase the
level of economic activity through incremental inventions at the cost of economic
growth. Of course, the linear technological progress of incremental improvements
is still progress, but it means that the growth rate of the economy will continu-
ously decline.
If the social planner wants to preserve the arrival rate of disruptive inventions
in the economy, he has to slow down the rate at which producing firms poach
disruptive inventors. There are in principle two ways to achieve this: One is
to decrease the value of the stock of incremental inventors, which decreases the
incentive to poach. Increasing the separation rate of inventors and firms or de-
creasing the market power that firms enjoy on the goods market would both work
in this direction. However, these are large interventions into the markets. The
second route is to decrease the ability of large producing firms to poach disruptive
inventors. An easy step in this direction would be to restrict startup acquisitions
significantly. There is an active literature on the questions of whether startup
acquisitions are welfare enhancing (Cabral, 2018; Piazza and Zheng, 2019). My
paper offers an additional argument for prohibiting such acquisitions.
Income in the economy is derived from the wages of technicians, the profits
of firms and the wages of incremental and disruptive inventors. As in the base
model of Akcigit and Kerr (2018), the revenue of producing firms within each
technology field/product is constant. Of that revenue, a fixed share goes to tech-
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nicians pay for labor input into production. The remainder pays the rents of
firms and their investments into inventors.
Firms pay out a fixed share α of the quality increases that incremental inven-
tions produce to their incremental inventors. If firms hire disruptive inventors,
they pay them out of their share 1− α. This reduces their stream of profits, but
increases the expected duration of this stream. Poaching disruptive inventors is
only profitable if the expected profits of disruptive inventors (Λdisωcfe) are smaller
than what firms can earn from incremental inventions ((1−α)ΛincV Patent). Oth-
erwise, equation (4.13) will yield a sclerosis threshold larger than 1 and no firms
will actually poach inventors.
4.4 Conclusion
As productivity growth is declining across frontier economies, it is urgent to un-
derstand firm innovation as a determinant of productivity development. This
study offers a general equilibrium framework to analyze how inventors and firms
match and which research avenues firms pursue. In a search and matching la-
bor market, firms have to acquire expertise in a technology and then build and
protect a portfolio of specialized inventors to do research. Thus, producing firms
are invested in existing technologies and resist disruptive inventions that might
make their own technology obsolete. Firms can impede disruptive technology
growth either by outright buying disruptive firms or by poaching the inventors
disruptive startups need. Firms focus on incremental improvements that increase
the quality of their product, but do not change the general technology structure.
The model describes the situation found in empirical work well: Section 3.4
documents that technology clusters are dominated by very few firms. The model
predicts that firms that impede disruptive innovation hire more inventors and
pursue smaller, more incremental inventions. Thus, patent counts rise and pro-
ductivity growth falls. Poege et al. (2019) and Akcigit and Kerr (2018) have
grouped patents into incremental improvements and more radical innovation us-
ing the quality of scientific literature linked to the patent and the citations from
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other firms. Both have found that more ambitious patents are more valuable
to the applicant. Despite that, firms’ research has become more incremental
(Arora et al., 2019). Firms produce more and more patents with an increasing
number of researchers, whose productivity is falling, yet whose wages do not de-
crease (Cowen and Southwood, 2019; Bloom et al., 2017). My model offers a
reinterpretation of this finding: Firms might decide to only look for incremental
improvements as a strategy to protect their rents. However, creating exponential
growth with incremental improvements is indeed getting harder and harder. As
a result, there might be a troublesome misallocation of inventive talent to incre-
mental innovation with declining returns.
The model implies several levers for policy intervention: One example is ban-
ning the acquisition of startups. Such regulation, while difficult to codify and
enforce, would prohibit large firms from monopolizing research talent and inhibit-
ing technology disruption. This is equivalent to making it more difficult to poach
disruptive inventors in my model. Extending merger controls to labor markets
has been suggested e.g. by Naidu et al. (2018), but for different reasons than the
ones presented here. However, there have also been arguments in favor of startup
buyouts. Among others, Cabral (2018) argues that allowing incumbents to buy
startups can increase the incentive to innovate: Potential entrepreneurs should
start more innovative firms because they expect to sell to big corporations. This
argument need not even hold in traditional endogenous growth models, where
the amount of research alone determines growth (Piazza and Zheng, 2019). If
different types of innovation exist, the argument breaks down: Large firms can
also acquire startups to suppress disruptive innovation and redirect R&D into
incremental research.
My model’s implications for inventor mobility are less clear cut: Since the
production function is supermodular, sorting all inventors to the best firm yields
more incremental patents. In this sense, e.g. improving the search technology is
beneficial. Hence, strong assortative matching increases short-run growth. How-
ever, strong assortative matching also implies large monopoly profits for high
quality producing firms, who will then oppose disruptive inventions. The exact
effect depends on which actions these firms can take, but long-run growth will
106 CHAPTER 4. INVENTOR LABOR MARKET & GROWTH
decline. Optimal policy could target the search technology to disperse inventors
more widely among firms or levy taxes that increase with a firm’s share of patents
in any technology cluster.
Apart from these results, the paper also makes a technical contribution by
demonstrating how an elementary search and matching labor market can be in-
serted into a general equilibrium model without greatly increasing its complexity.
Given that the equilibria in search and matching models are most often found
through numerical simulation (Rogerson et al., 2005; Hagedorn et al., 2017), this
represents a significant step in its own right.
Chapter 5
Summary
My dissertation consists of three studies, all viewing aggregate productivity as
driven by the individual decisions of firms and the inventors that work for them.
I use microeconometric analysis to study why firms innovate and economic theory
to link these decisions to macroeconomic outcomes.
The first paper in this dissertation studies how German manufacturing firms
adjust their productivity in response to an increase in competition from foreign
markets. German firms only increase their productivity if their new competi-
tors come from other industrialized economies. This productivity increase is not
driven by innovation. Instead, firms cut input expenses and prices while main-
taining their output.
The second paper traces the matching decisions of firms and inventors on the
labor markets of developed economies. It adapts empirical techniques used in
labor economics to this special segment of the labor market and shows that as-
sortative matching has been increasing from 1974 to 2012: High quality inventors
go to high quality firms more often than was the case in previous decades. This
cannot be explained by changes in the patent invention function: The produc-
tivity of a match between a firm and an inventor of constant quality remains
roughly unchanged.
The third paper develops an endogenous growth model with inventor labor
markets and two types of innovation: disruptive inventions that change the under-
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lying technology of firms’ products and incremental improvements over existing
products. Firms acquire expertise in certain technologies by hiring the inventors
who are experts in these fields. This gives them a strong incentive to prevent
disruptive inventions: If the underlying technology changes, their investment
in these inventors becomes worthless. Large firms inhibit aggregate growth by
poaching inventors from firms engaged in disruptive innovation.
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Summary Statistics for German
Manufacturing Firms
Table A.1 displays summary statistics for our sample of firms entering our final
estimation of the effect of import competition on within firm productivity.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Sample Firms
Mean SD P25 Median P75 Obs.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm productivity 2.82 0.85 2.26 2.72 3.21 78,414
Deflated Revenue (1000 e) 97,600 1,21,000 5,443 14,200 44,200 78,414
Labor (FTEs) 351.10 2773.90 47 98 244 78,414
Deflated capital stock (1000 e) 61,000 613,000 2,662 8,220 28,200 78,414
Deflated intermediate inputs (1000 e) 70,700 973,000 3,088 8,734 28,800 78,414
Deflated capital per FTE (1000 e) 118.25 130.15 43.57 81.28 145.77 78,414
% of revenue from exports 23.86 25.16 0.54 16.46 40.31 78,414
Export status dummy 0.78 0.42 1 1 1 78,414
R&D status dummy 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 78,414
pf
avg.pg
3.19 11.40 0.90 1.26 2.23 78,414
Number of products 4.04 8.53 1 2 4 78,414
Total import competition 5.45 10.53 0.04 0.97 5.74 78,117
High-income import competition 1.70 4.20 0 0.15 1.42 78,117
Low-income import competition 3.75 9.02 0.02 0.40 2.97 78,117
Notes: Table A.1 reports summary statistics for sample firms. All statistics are based on the sample
of firms entering the estimation. Since firms without contemporaneous import competition measures
can enter the estimation, N is slightly lower for these variables.
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Table A.2: Comparison of Firms with Competition from High vs. Low Income Countries
Firms predominantly exposed Firms predominantly exposed
to import competition from to import competition from
high-income countries low-/middle-income countries
(mean / median) (mean / median)
ICHigh−Income 13.44 / 10.63 1.29 / 0.63
ICLow−Income 1.79 / 1.30 20.22 / 13.41
K/L (e/ fte) 123,185 / 83,251 92,076 / 68,846
R&D Ex / L (e/ fte) 5,926 / 1,683 1,340 / 0
R&D Ex / Sales (%) 3.05 / 1.06 0.76 / 0
Note: Firms are exposed predominantly to import competition from high-/low-income countries
if competition from high-/low-income countries is at least three times larger than competition
from low-/high-income countries. Import competition from high-income countries and from
middle- and low-income countries as in equation (2.1), unweighted mean / median, 2000-2014.
Import competition is the share (in domestic production of German manufacturing firms) of im-
ports from a certain group of countries. The group of high-income countries (for ICHigh−Incomeit−1 )
includes USA, Canada, Japan, and South Korea. The group of low-income countries (for
ICLow−Incomeit−1 ) includes China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Mexico,
Malaysia, Turkey, Thailand, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Pak-
istan (see 2.2 for a discussion on country selection). Capital to labor ratio, K/L, is measured in
euro per employee (in full time equivalents, fte), unweighted mean / median, 2000-2014. R&D
Ex / L is R&D expenditures in euro per employee (in full time equivalents, fte), unweighted
mean / median, 2000-2014. R&D Ex / Sales is R&D expenditures in euro over total sales in
euro (in %), unweighted mean / median, 2000-2014.
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Appendix B
Firm-Specific Price Indices
We construct a firm-specific price index to purge firm revenues from price varia-
tion. The calculation of this price index closely follows Eslava et al. (2004). In
particular, we construct a firm-specific Tornqvist index for the firms’ composite











where pigt is the price of good g and sigt is the corresponding share of this
good in the production at firm i in period t. Thus, the growth of the index value
is the product of the individual products’ price growths, each weighted with the
average revenue share of that product over this year and the last. We use the
first year available in the data as our base year, i.e. we set Pt=2000 = 100. For
firms entering after 2000, we use an industry average of our firm price indices
as a starting value. Similarly, we follow Eslava et al. (2004) and impute missing
product price growth information in other cases with an average of product price
changes within the same industry (for some products, firms do not have to report
quantities, because they would not be meaningful).
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Appendix C
Construction of Capital Stock
from Investment
We construct capital stocks at the firm level using a perpetual inventory method.
To estimate the first capital stock of every series, we combine information on the
value of yearly depreciations of firms τit included in the AFiD-data, with informa-
tion on the average lifetime of capital goods, Dt(Θ), where Θ=(equipment,buildings)
highlights that this information exists separately for building and equipment cap-
ital (this information is provided by the Federal Statistical Office). For now, let
us abstract from the different capital good types. Note that the lifetime of capital
goods contains information about their real depreciation rate.1 As is standard
in the literature, we assume that capital depreciates at a constant rate and that
it is fully destroyed (depreciated) at the end of its lifetime. Let us define the
amount of capital which depreciated during the production process in industry j
and period t as:
φjt = δj0Kjt
where δj0 is the depreciation rate of capital purchased at time t = 0. The












1Ultimately, we augment an approach based on Mueller (2008) by backing out the implied
depreciation rate in a way that is consistent with a constant depreciation rate, the prevailing
assumption in the literature.
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With a little algebra, one can show that assuming a standard capital depreciation
of the form Kjt = Kj0(1− δj0)t, and substituting it into (C.1) gives:
Dj0 =
δj0
ln (1− δj0) ln (1− δj0)
As Djt(Θ) is known, we can recover δjt by solving this expression numerically for
each year and each capital type, Θ=(equipment,buildings). This generates two
depreciation rates for each point in time. We then define a single industry-specific
depreciation rate by using the shares of the industry-wide stocks of equipment
and building capital at time t as weights. Finally, we simplify by assuming
that the depreciation rate for the entire capital stock in each period equals the
depreciation rate of newly purchased capital, i.e. δj0 = δjt. Having calculated
δjt, we can recover a starting capital stock for every firm by using information on




Now we can compute our capital series by:
Kit = Kit−1(1− δjt−1) + Iit−1.
where Iit denotes firm-specific investment. As our capital stocks are based on
information on the lifetime of capital goods, they are a closer approximation of
the capital actually used in firms’ production activities than capital stocks based
on book values. This is because firms might buy and sell their capital goods
not to market prices and have incentives to depreciate their accounting capital





In the following we present the first stage regressions belonging to our baseline
results presented in the main text. As we always use the same instruments for
the same endogenous variables, our first stage regressions are identical for all
regressions using the same set of firms. Hence, we only show two sets of first
stage regressions: one for the full sample firms and one for the sample of firms
engaging in R&D activities. Those first stage regressions are respectively reported
in the following D.1 and D.2.
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ISHigh+Low→thirdit−1 0.235*** - -
(0.0197) - -
ISHigh→thirdit−1 - -0.0995*** 0.0314***
- (0.0117) (0.0111)
ISLow→thirdit−1 - 0.0156*** 0.279***
- (0.0051) (0.0224)
Firm x Industry FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Firm-level controls YES YES YES
Observations 78,414 78,414 78,414
R-squared 0.950 0.927 0.946
Number of firms 16,925 16,925 16,925
Notes: This table reports results from the first stage regressions
when estimating equation (2.10) by IV using the full sample of firms.
The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively is the
lagged total import competition measure, the lagged high-income im-
port competition measure, and the lagged low-income import compe-
tition measure. All regressions include time and industry times firm
fixed effects and controls for firms’ number of products and export in-
tensity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Significance:
*10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Firm x Industry FE YES
Time FE FE YES
Firm-level controls FE YES
Observations 26,544 26,544
R-squared 0.928 0.952
Number of firms 5305 5305
Notes: This table reports results from the
first stage regressions when estimating equation
(2.10) by IV using the sample of firms that en-
gage in R&D activities. The dependent variable
in columns 1 and 2 respectively is the lagged
high-income import competition measure and
the lagged low-income import competition mea-
sure. All regressions include time and industry
times firm fixed effects and controls for firms’
number of products and export intensity. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Sig-
nificance: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 per-
cent.
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Appendix E
Using Patent Data as an
Employer-Employee Data Set
Since PATSTAT does not contain IDs, only string names, I consolidate spelling
mistakes and disambiguate entities with the same name before using the data.
This appendix describes the procedure.
First, Magerman et al. (2006) have already constructed consolidated identi-
fiers by correcting spelling mistakes, omitting titles and reading out abbreviations
like ”Ltd.”. They have also constructed a sector variable, which assigns names in
the database to categories like ”company”, ”individual”, ”university” etc. After
fusing such different spellings of the same name, they find an additional 30% of
patents for the top 450 applicants, compared to the raw HAN identifiers provided
by PATSTAT.
Second, Peeters et al. (2010) have manually checked the record of the top 450
applicants and searched for additional possible variants in the data. They can
assign another 30% of patents to these applicants. However, since some of these
applicants have over 100.000 patents in different countries, different spellings and
mistakes play a much larger role than in the general population.
To disambiguate additional names both on the inventor and firm side, I clean
names similarly to Magerman et al. (2006) and then sort all words alphabetically.
This equates reversed spellings of names like ”Erik van Houten” and ”van Houten,
Erik”. This reduces the number of unique inventor identifiers by another 25%.
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I additionally clean firm names of addresses that are sporadically entered in the
field ”name”, e.g. ”Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, CA”. This fuses around 3%
of the remaining firm identifiers.
To gauge the quality of the resulting ID, I draw a list of prominent inventors
from Wikipedia and link them to our data. Just as Peeters et al. (2010) for the
firm side, I find that these highly active individuals are split over multiple IDs
due to spelling mistakes, different name formats etc. However, the automated
correction of Magerman et al. (2006) already does a decent job of aggregating
them: After manual search, I e.g. link 38 PATSTAT person IDs to the most
prolific inventor in the world (Dr. Shunpai Yamazaki). Magerman et al. (2006)
already linked the most important 30, so I can only marginally improve upon
their results. My 38 IDs participate in 5585 patent families across the world
while the 30 IDs of Magerman et al. (2006) participate in 5581. The newly dis-
covered name variants are clearly errors that only show up once. In addition,
such spelling variants often show up within a patent family where the inventor
is also cited on other patents. The patent family is the relevant unit of observa-
tion. Thus, even if undetected spelling variants exist, they are largely irrelevant
to my productivity measures. I thus have confidence that the IDs provided by
Magerman et al. (2006) capture the large majority of an inventor’s patents.
However, this still leaves the problem that some names might belong to more
than one inventor. Combining such inventors into one person would create the
impression of a prolific inventor frequently moving between firms.
First, I collect the frequency with which words occur in the inventor names
submitted on patents in each country. I then eliminate inventor names that do
not contain two infrequent words: E.g., ”Erik van Houten” contains two words
common in Dutch names (”Erik” and ”van”) and only one uncommon word
”Houten”. Thus, I will not consider this inventor in the sample.
Second, PATSTAT contains the IPC classes associated with each inventor’s
patents. Inventors will typically not master a variety of technical fields and thus
names with more diverse portfolios are more likely to stand for more than one in-
ventor. Specifically, I exclude workers whose most common IPC 4-digit category
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accounts for 20% or less of their patents, whose top technology field accounts for
50% or less of their patents and whose top two technology fields account for 80%
or less of their patents. I check these numbers against the statistics for inventors
crosschecked with Wikipedia to guarantee that these criteria are not too strict.
Third, I exclude inventors from the sample who were active for more than 40
years, on the basis that these are likely overlapping inventors of the same name.
The observed time span, the diversity of IPC classes and technology com-
munities and the number of distinct names are conceptually different criteria.
Nonetheless, they are reasonably correlated (0.15-0.6), which suggests that the
criteria identify suspect inventors reliably.
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Appendix F
Constructing Technology
Clusters from IPC Classes
This appendix details how I extract sub-labor markets from the IPC classes of
inventors’ patents. Each patent is assigned to one or more IPC classes that de-
scribe its technological contents. Not all inventors are interchangeable. Not all
inventors can work on all research projects. I.e., there is horizontal as well as
vertical differentiation between inventors. To sort all inventors into one ranking
would thus be misguided. The goal of the algorithm below is to separate inven-
tors into groups: These groups have to be so small that every inventor in the
group can contribute to the work of the other members of the group. However,
they have to be so large as to include every inventor who could substitute for the
members of the group.
I reduce the sample to all patents with only one inventor, so that the assig-
nation of IPC classes to inventors is unambiguous. I observe the succession of
combinations of IPC 4-digit classes every inventor patents in, sorting IPC classes
from the same patent or from patents in the same year in a random order. From
this I compute the conditional probability of an inventor whose last patent was in
one combination to move to another one. E.g.: If only one inventor ever applies
for a patent with the IPC class ”A01P” and then patents in the class ”B06P”, I
would conclude that the two combinations are very similar, since 100% of inven-
tors moved from one to the other.
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I find that even IPC 8-digit classes form a network that is only sparsely
connected by moving inventors: Most inventors only patent in very few classes
and mobility between classes is rare.
Figure F.1: The figure shows the distribution of movement probabilities between
IPC class combinations. The top figure shows the distribution for common IPC
classes (with more than 100 patents). The bottom figure shows the same dis-
tribution for the less common classes. Evidently, less frequent classes are often
strongly connected. In contrast, the frequent classes stand more alone. Red,
green and blue describe the movement probabilities to the nearest, nearest two
and nearest three other classes.
This sparseness of the network also determines my strategy for defining clus-
ters: Since the network has many nodes, few strong edges and the number of
final clusters and their geometrical forms are unknown, density based clustering
will efficiently yield the network structure.
First, I assign every IPC class with less than 1% of patents to the nearest
class with more than 1%, to avoid many small clusters with few inventors. I then
use density clustering among the large IPC classes to determine which classes to
combine into clusters. The ”knee” in the 3-nearest neighbor cdf is at roughly
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0.11, which I take as the ε for density based clustering: All connections with a
movement probability of 11% or higher are selected into the same cluster.
Figure F.2: knn distance plot of inventor movement probabilities. Distance is
defined as 1- movement probability. Note the uptake of the cdf for big clusters
at roughly 0.11. I will take this as the ε parameter in density based clustering.
Thus, most small IPC class combinations will be fused into clusters.
The result of this procedure is a stable assignment of IPC classes to technology
clusters. Around 20% of patents are part of the largest cluster. Figure F.3
shows the technology field assignment of the biggest IPC groups and the strength
of their relations with each other. For comparison, figure F.4 also reports the
community assignments of an alternative community finding algorithm for large
data sets (Pons and Latapy, 2005). It results in significantly larger communities
because small nodes with connections to two large communities often are enough
to connect the two large communities. This happens even though these small
notes represent a negligible amount of patents. Hence, the algorithm is highly
sensible to which small nodes and weak edges are considered. If neither are
included, the largest community contains roughly 50% of all patents, which is
not plausible as a sub-labor market: Mobility within this large community is low.
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Figure F.3: Technology fields of
and connections between the largest
IPC classes. Classes were grouped
into fields using a density based
algorithm that groups together all
classes connected through an in-
ventor movement probability above
11%. Thicker and darker arrows
denote more movements of inven-
tors from one technology class to the
other. The size of the classes denotes
the number of patents assigned to
each class.
Figure F.4: Technology fields of
and connections between the largest
IPC classes. Classes were grouped
into fields using the walktrap algo-
rithm of Pons and Latapy (2005).
Thicker and darker arrows denote
more movements of inventors from
one technology class to the other.
The size of the classes denotes the




In this framework, the expected number of patents per year λyx is constant within
one match. Specifically, I treat λyx as the Poisson arrival rate of new patents,
given x and y. Each match exists for a given number of years (ltrue). Let type
j denote all employment spells with the same ltrue and λtrue. I understand the
untruncated data as generated by a mixture distribution of different types of
employment spells. I define sl;λ as the share of type l;λ in the overall mix of
types. E.g., all employment spells lasting 5 years and producing 0.3 patents per
year would be considered a type, with s5;0.3 giving the share of such employment
spells in all spells.
s, the vector of the individual type’s population shares, has to be recovered from
the observed minimum length of employment spells lob (the time between the first
and the last patent) and the distribution of patents during these years. The only
additional assumption necessary is that workers do not leave a firm between two
observed patents, so that I can recover a minimum length of each spell from the
data. I will recover ŝ and from this construct unbiased estimates λ̂yx and l̂
y
x for
each observation from the estimated distribution of true types.
This procedure is necessary since the estimates λ̂yx and l̂ given Pob & lob cannot
be computed for each match in isolation: Consider a match for which I observe
one patent in one year. This observation could either be an unproductive match
that lasted for a long time or a productive, but short lived one. The one data
point itself is not informative on the matter. However, if unproductive and long
matches were common in the data, I would also observe some of them. Thus,
the whole observed distribution informs my estimate for one specific observation.
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Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the whole distribution jointly.
Given that the above setup already assumes a Poisson distribution for patents,
a maximum likelihood estimator does not require additional assumptions, but is
more efficient. Unfortunately, it requires the optimization of a non-linear log like-
lihood function over several 1000 parameters, so it is only feasible when making
additional simplifying assumptions. Therefore, I estimate the spell distribution
using GMM.





Nob denotes the expected number of times a specific outcome (like 2 patents in-
terrupted by a year of inactivity) is observed. It equals the sum of the expected
number of occurrences given each of the specific types. p(ob|j) is a constant
number: E.g. the chance to observe the above two patents interrupted by one
year of silence for type 5; 0.3 is about 2%. Treating N(j) as the coefficients to
be estimated, one has a data set with several million different possible outcomes
and how often they have occured in the data, which one can use to estimate the
several thousand N(j)s. Note that since N(j) has to be greater than 0, this is not
strictly linear. However, it is still computable in a very reasonable time frame:
Because of the positivity constraint on all coefficients, there is no analytical solu-
tion and several possible numerical techniques exist. Aside from estimating the
whole system of equations jointly, splitting the data is a possibility, too: Since
observations with e.g. 20 observed years can only be created by spells of at least
length 20, one could estimate longer employment lengths first and then ”cas-
cade” down the spell lengths. Additionally, it is numerically hard to recover the
distribution for very short spells because there are comparatively few different
observable outcomes. I test specifications where I restrict the underlying true
employment spells to be either at least 2 or at least 4 years long. I either use
the whole distribution in the estimation (including the very short outcomes), or
exclude the shortest observed outcomes from the estimation as well. This leads
to 8 different numerical techniques.
Since their qualitative results are very similar and additional assumptions do not
seem to yield more stable results, I opt to estimate using all available data and as-
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suming that no employment spell is shorter than 4 years. While this method leads
to a slightly better fit, all different strategies yield very comparable estimates:
Figure G.1: Adjustment of observed employment spell productivity and length.
The starting point of each arrow is the productivity and length observed in the
data without the correction routine. The end point of each arrow gives the new
estimated arrival rate of patents after the routine has concluded. Red highlights
spells where the observed productivity was adjusted downward, blue highlights
spells where the observed productivity was adjusted upwards. Each panel is
the result of a slightly different numerical technique. The left table contains
results when imputing for each spell length separately, the right table contains
the results when fitting to the whole data at once. Within each table, the top
two panels report the result when assuming that employment spells last at least
4 or 2 years respectively. The lower two panels report results when making the
same assumption, but also only targeting the part of the data that contains at
least 4 or 2 consecutive years. All methods come to broadly similar conclusions.
Estimating for each spell length separately is less efficient, but much faster.
The Poisson distribution underlies all of the above estimations. This distribu-
tion is used both in theoretical models (Akcigit and Kerr, 2018) and in empirical
applications throughout a vast range of scenarios, even including sport scores
(Karlis, 2003). The central assumption of the Poisson distribution is that the
arrival rate of events is constant, which seems suspect in many circumstances in-
cluding patents: It seems reasonable that after a successfully completed project,
the arrival rate of success falls and then rises again after some time has passed.
However, in practice, it seems that inventors work on different projects simul-
taneously so that a constant arrival rate is a good fit for the data. The only
systematic forecasting error of the Poisson model is for very successful spells:
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The model assumes that inventors with multiple patents per year can uphold
their performance, which seems to not always be the case. However, this con-
cerns a negligible number of inventors. G.2 reports systematic mismatch of the
Poisson model of patent invention for each numerical technique. Evidently, the
fit is very good for all outcomes except rare and high productivity outcomes.
Figure G.2: The ratio of the predicted times each outcome should occur and
the actual number of occurrences. The fit is very good for results occurring more
often, there is a slight upward bias for very rare and very productive spells, whose
frequency of occurrences is overestimated. Each panel is the result of a slightly
different numerical technique. The left table contains results when imputing for
each spell length separately, the right table contains the results when fitting to
the whole data at once. Within each table, the top two panels report the result
when assuming that employment spells last at least 4 or 2 years respectively. The
lower two panels report results when making the same assumption, but also only
targeting the part of the data that contains at least 4 or 2 consecutive years. All
methods come to broadly similar conclusions. Estimating for each spell length
separately is less efficient, but much faster.
Once I have estimated a distribution of λfi and (l) with either GMM or ML,
I compute the implied shares of all types, given any realization of Pob & lob. I
can thus derive my final estimates p̂ & l̂ for any observation. Based on the same
technique, I can also obtain an estimate of how likely it is to observe the under-




While the Hagedorn et al. (2017) method is a consistent estimator, its perfor-
mance in the actual data is more unclear: Since there are usually only a few
observations for every inventor, a consistent estimator might not perform well in
practice. A Monte Carlo simulation will reveal the estimator’s performance in
more realistic samples.
The simulated data covers a 40 year stretch of a technology cluster, just like
the actual data. Every year, inventors enter the technology cluster. However,
not all matches produce a patent and thus not all matches are observed. With
around 50.000 observed inventors the simulated data is as large as the smallest
actual technology cluster.
Inventors have a constant chance ρ to match with a firm. They then com-
pare the firm’s quality to the quality of their current firms and decide whether to
switch or not. Whenever inventors have to decide between two firms, they will
pick the one with the higher quality: Since the higher quality firm will produce
more patents, it can offer a higher wage and secure the inventor.
In the main specification, the parameters of the model are as follows:
 The patent invention function is λxi,yf = xi ∗ yf
147
148 APPENDIX H. SIMULATION
 Inventors match with a new random firm with a 5% probability every year
 Inventors leave the economy with a 10% probability every year
 Inventors and firms will reject any matches that do not at least produce
skill2+quality2
2.05
The algorithm to recover the estimates contains four steps:
First, using the estimated overall distribution of employment spells (appendix
G), the algorithm computes the unconditional distribution of potential types for
every observed spell: It computes that e.g. 5% of all observed spells with one
patent are produced by employment spells with a patent arrival rate of 0.5 and
a length of 7.
Second, using this underlying distribution, the algorithm draws 20 potential un-
derlying productivities for every observed spell. These serve as hypotheses about
the actual ”true” productivity that led to the observed patent outcome.
Third, the algorithm prunes these hypotheses: It computes how many observed
spells of a certain type we expect to see, given the drawn productivities. In the
case of a firm with 100 employees, all of which have only one patent, it would e.g.
conclude that a patent arrival rate of 0.5 and a length of 7 is an unreasonable
hypothesis for these spells: The firm would also have to have more successful
inventors. The ”only one patent”-outcome is overrepresented in the data. The
algorithm sequentially prunes these hypotheses, recomputing the expected distri-
bution after each discarded draw. The algorithm stops after only 5 hypotheses
are remaining.
Lastly, the algorithm runs the whole ranking estimator five times, once for each
set of drawn productivities. This allows to estimate how sensitive an estimated
rank is to plausible variations in productivities and thus how large the estimation
error for each ranking is.
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Figure H.1: The left graph reports the patent invention function using the true
parameters of the model: Combinations of inventors and firms with higher skill
produce more patents according to λxi,yf = xi ∗ yf . Grey areas of the matching
plane have no matches in them, so the patent arrival rate is not reported for
these.
Just using global rankings, the estimator recovers these parameters reliably:
Figure H.1 compares the estimated and the true production function, which are
by and large identical. Figure H.2 shows the number of matches for each skill
and quality level. The estimator also recovers the core region with match support
reliably. Only some single matches are estimated to be in actually empty regions
of the matching plane.
Figure H.2: The left graph shows the matching behavior of inventors and firms,
using their true skill and quality bins. The grey area has no matches, because in-
ventors and firms reject matches that do not produce a positive matching surplus.
The right panel shows the estimated distribution of matches. Apart from some
single matches in the empty regions, the estimate recovers the true distribution
well.
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Appendix I
Numerical Simulation of the
Model Economy
This appendix details the result of a simulation of the model economy where Λdis
is much higher than the sum of the interest rate r and the separation rate δ. For
this purpose, Λdis(0) is set to 50%, the interest rate to 5% and the separation
rate to 5%. 50% is clearly to high for the rate of disruptive technology change, as
it would imply that every second sector of the economy is disrupted every year,
making incremental inventors obsolete. Nonetheless, even under these extreme
conditions, the qualitative results of the model hold:
Figure I.1: The graph shows the average rate of disruptive inventions throughout
the whole economy for δ = r = 0.05; Λdis(0) = 0.5.
While the economy converges to the non-disruptive equilibrium much slower
(100 is the simulated time in the main paper), the qualitative path is very similar
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to that of the economy where the parameter restriction holds.
A closer look at the expected change in the disruptive rate makes clear why
this is the case (figure I.2): Even with these extreme assumptions, the expected
change in the rate of disruption is only positive when the risk of a disruptive
invention in the technology field is already very low, only to converge to 0 from
above.
Figure I.2: The expected change in the arrival rate of disruptive inventions for a
sector. The rate is expected to go down when it is high and to slightly increase
when it is already very low. However, if no disruption happen, the expected
change approaches 0 as the rate of disruption becomes zero itself.
Clearly, an equilibrium where technology fields with increasing and decreasing
rates of disruption cancel each other out in the aggregate is not achievable for all
plausible values of Λdis(0).
Appendix J
Abbreviations
AFiD Amtliche Firmendaten in Deutschland: Firm panel of the
German statistical Offices
AMADEUS Firm panel compiled by the Bureau van Dijk
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
EPO European Patent Office
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FE Fixed Effects
FTE Full Time Equivalent
GML Generalized Maximum Likelihood
GMM Generalized Method of Moments
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IO Industrial Organization
IPC International Patent Classification: System of codes that




154 APPENDIX J. ABBREVIATIONS
knn k-nearest-neighbors
ML Maximum Likelihood
M and A Mergers and Aquisitions
NP-hard non-deterministic polynomial-time hard: A problem that cannot
be solved in polynomial time
NUTS Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques:
internationally standardized subdivisions of countries
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
PATSTAT Global patent data set compiled by the European Patent Office
PRODCOM Products of the European Community: 8-digit product codes of
the European Union
R and D Research and Development
TFP Total Factor Productivity: Productivity residual of a multifactor
production function
TFPQ Total Factor Productivity, Quantity based: Productivity residual
of a multifactor quantity production function
TFPR Total Factor Productivity, Revenue based: Productivity residual
of a multifactor revenue production function
